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“The Nordic Model is dead” the Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho said in 1997. The Nordic identity which 
originated during the Cold War experienced an ontological crisis with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the bipolar world order. In the 1990’s discourses of Europeanisation emerged and the Nordic 
identity was by many deemed a Cold War construct. Since the middle of the 2000s Nordic cooperation 
gained a stronghold where it previously had not existed: within security cooperation. The overall re-
emergence of Nordic cooperation took place in parallel with the growing Russian superpower ambitions. 
Since 2009 there have been more notable advances in Nordic security cooperation through the 
establishment of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and the signing of the Nordic 
Declaration of Solidarity. These advances are remarkable because security has previously been a non-
issue in the construction of the Nordic identity. The inclusion of security and defence cooperation in the 
Nordic identity can be labelled paradigmatic.  
 
The theoretical approach is one of poststructuralist discourse analysis, which advocates a reality 
completely constructed in discourse and rejects any pre-existent identities. The premise is that the self is 
constructed in discourse through the articulation of a number of others. This Thesis is concerned with how 
Russia is constructed in Nordic security discourses and how it contributes to a Nordic identity. The 
primary sources consist of four reports published in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark respectively. 
The foreign, security and defence policy reports are either written or commissioned by the respective 
governments. Similar reports from before the Russian annexation are used to support the primary data 
and allows for a deeper understanding about how discourses about Russia have shifted.  
 
The study shows that Russia has replaced economic benefits as the primary incentive for Nordic 
cooperation. The focus of Nordic cooperation has shifted its focus from the global to the regional and the 
Baltic Sea Region is increasingly important. The discourses clearly reject the Cold War identity of the 
“Third Way” between the two poles of the bipolar system. Rather the Nordic identity is integrated in the 
Western security and value community. It is also notable that despite this, the Nordic countries’ views on 
Russia, the world and the near vicinity differ. History, geopolitics and membership in NATO and/or EU 
play a big role in shaping the respective national understanding of security. The differing understandings 
of security represent the biggest obstacle for Nordic security and defence cooperation. The Thesis also 
discusses the role of hybrid warfare, NATO and norms and values in the othering of Russia in Nordic 
identity construction.  
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“Is it the case that Nordic identity has been chipped away too much by 
European Union membership, globalisation and by new consumerist 
politics within states? Or is there a new area - security and defence - to 
plant the Nordic flags where they have rarely been seen before?” 
1
 
 
- Clive Archer, 2009  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
After the collapse of the Cold War, the question of Russian identity on the international arena 
was to intrigue many. Would such a country be able to refrain from superpower ambitions, for a 
place as an equal among many sovereign states? By the end of the 2010’s it was clear that Russia 
had superpower ambitions and was also prepared to flex its military muscle. What can be seen as 
the most recent culmination of these ambitions is the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and 
its action in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. It is by many considered a severe blow to the European 
post-Cold War security order. The European Union responded to the Russian action through the 
implementation of economic sanctions on Russia with the claim that the European security order 
had been challenged, bringing security back into the public and political discourse. 
Norden; Europe’s most Nordic region, has historically always been affected by Russian action. 
This was also the case after the Russian annexation of Crimea.  A region, traditionally defined by 
its peaceful character, social-democratic welfare model and respect for human rights, had 
suffered a loss of identity in the post-Cold War era. There was a notable decline in discourses 
about Nordic cooperation, along with the rise of Europeanisation policies. Coinciding with 
Russia’s growing superpower ambitions, a revival of Nordic cooperation could be perceived. 
                                                     
1
 Archer, Clive (2009): The Nordic States and the European Security and Defence Policy: national, 
Nordic or European in (ed.) Götz, Norbert & Haggrén, Heidi: Regional Cooperation and International 
Organizations: The Nordic Model in transnational alignement. Routledge, London & New York, p 165 
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Causes for this increase in Nordic cooperation are considered to be the effects of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 on the European Union, the decrease of US interests in Europe and the 
polarisation of societies. Russian foreign policy can also be interpreted as central to this shift. 
This is where the nexus of this Thesis’ research lies.  
The recent shift in Nordic identity, through the inclusion of security and defence cooperation, 
can be understood as paradigmatic. Military and security cooperation have for national security 
reasons, remained outside Nordic cooperation. Nordic security and peace has been ensured 
through processes of asecuritisation.
2
 Rather than security being intentionally left off the agenda, 
asecuritisation denotes a process where security is understood as a non-issue completely. Unlike 
the European Union, the Nordics have never justified Nordic cooperation as a peace project, 
where deeper integration secures a more stable peace. Instead, the peace has been established 
through the non-existence of security in discourses of Nordic cooperation. Now, security as both 
a concern and possibility has entered the discourse regarding Nordic cooperation, for the first 
time in modern history.  
Herein lays the foundation of the research question for this Thesis, which is concerned with 
Nordic identities and how the portrayal of Russia contributes to a shift in the understanding of 
Nordic identity. The particular focus is how the enemy image of Russia is constructed in security 
discourses, through processes of othering, and its impact on the understanding of the Nordic 
identity. 
1.1. The Research Question  
 
How does the othering of Russia in Nordic security discourses contribute to the social 
construction of Nordic identity after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014? 
1.2.  Theory & Data  
 
The theoretical premises for this research question and this Thesis as a whole is the 
poststructuralist understanding of identity. Identity is constructed in discourse and the Self is 
                                                     
2
 Browning, Christopher S. & Joenniemi, Pertti (2012): From fratricide to security community: re-
theorising difference in the constitution of Nordic peace. Journal of International Relations and 
Development, Vol. 16, no.4 pages 483 – 513: 494 
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created through the construction of multiple selves. Identity is always understood as fluid. 
Poststructuralist theory states that all reality is discursive. Foreign policy is understood as a 
“boundary-producing practice(s) central to the production and reproduction of identity in whose 
name it operates.”3 Through the thorough study of discourse, the aim is to discover the extent to 
which Russia after 2014 has been portrayed in Nordic security discourse and how it contributes 
towards the construction of a Nordic identity.  
The conditions in the choice of data were that they had to touch upon security, defence and 
foreign policy, published after 2014. The characteristics of the Nordic identity; as transnational 
rather than supranational led to the choice of four national discourses rather than one single 
Nordic one (e.g. statements from the Nordic Council of Ministers). The Nordic identity is the 
sum of the countries it constitutes and it is the by-product of this data.  
The primary data consists of four reports, from Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
respectively. The reports have been published after 2014 and they are either published by the 
national governments or commissioned by them. Finland has a tradition of publishing a 
government report (white paper) every four years. Denmark’s, Sweden’s and Norway’s 
governments have specifically commissioned reports regarding their security and defence 
policies. References to changes in the security environment are many.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3
Campbell David (1992) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 75 
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Table 1: The primary data 
Country Name of report Date published Commissioned by/author 
Finland Government report on Finnish 
Foreign and Security Policy 
June 2016 Finnish government /Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
Sweden “Säkerhet i ny tid” - Security in a 
New Era 
August 2016 Swedish government/ 
 Ambassador Krister Bringéus 
Norway “Ett felles løft” - A United Effort  April 2015 Minister of Defence Ine 
Eriksen Soreide/ External 
expert group on defence  
Denmark “Dansk diplomati og forsvar i en 
brydningstid” - Danish diplomacy 
and defence in times of upheaval 
May 2016 Danish government/ 
Ambassador Peter Taksoe-
Jensen 
 
1.3.  Aims and Objectives  
 
The aim and objective of this Thesis, is to gain a deeper understanding of Nordic identity in the 
thorough reading of the primary data and application of poststructuralist analysis. The Thesis 
aims to provide a review of the construction of Nordic cooperation, and how it has been shaped 
through a number of constitutional others. The aim is to gain an overview of the national 
differences in their approach to Russia, and yet also see the similarities. An understanding about 
how the barriers between “us “and “them” are formed in the Nordic context, in relation to Russia 
is also an objective, and how an inkling of how Nordic cooperation may take form in the future.  
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1.4.  Relevance of the Research Question 
 
Russia and the Russian threat in the Baltic Sea Region are often covered by respective Nordic 
national media sources. The Nordic region is increasingly being discussed along with the 
importance of the collective defence of the Baltic countries, precisely because Finland and 
Sweden are not NATO members. This coincides with the application of identity studies and 
regional studies to the Nordic region, through the recognition of a Nordic renaissance.  This 
Thesis combines two topical issues; the re-emergence of Nordic cooperation and the return of 
Russia superpower ambitions. The Thesis maintains its relevance through the focus on these two 
after the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russia aggression in Eastern Ukraine. The 
purpose is to see how one of these trends affects the other.  
1.5. Key Concepts  
 
1.5.1. What is Norden? Kärt barn har många namn4 
Norden, Scandinavia the North or the Nordic countries - the region goes under many names. 
Norden, which literally means the North in the Scandinavian languages, consists today of 
Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden as well as three autonomous areas; Greenland and 
the Faroe Islands (Denmark) and the Åland Islands (Finland). The region started to be referred as 
Norden more commonly only after World War One. Joint Nordic cooperation increased in 
international forums like the League of Nations during the Interwar Years
5
 as Finland also 
became more active. From then on, the Nordic countries were increasingly seen and treated as an 
entity by others. During the Cold War, a number Nordic institutions and forms of cooperation 
emerged. Norden gained an identity as peaceful and democratic, with societies defined by the 
emerging welfare state, later to be called the Nordic model.  
 
                                                     
4
Swedish proverb meaning: A beloved child has many names 
5
 Götz,Norbert (2009) ‘Blue-eyed angels’ at the League of Nations: The Genevese Construction of 
Norden in ed. Haggrén & Götz Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic 
Model in Transnational Alignment Routledge, New York: 26 
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The Nordic countries have not always been peaceful. In the five centuries prior to the 19
th
 
century the Nordic countries engaged in over 60 wars with each other.
6
 Since then, all Nordic 
disputes have been solved peacefully. The progression to the so called Nordic Peace, has led to 
the region in many respects being treated as an exception in the discipline of International 
Relations (IR). It is seen as a region where traditional notions of power politics cannot be 
applied. A pluralistic security community, that is, a region where war has become completely 
unthinkable, developed in Norden without a common enemy, neither spatial nor temporal. 
 
1.5.2. Poststructuralist Identity Construction & Othering 
 
Poststructuralist theory first emerged as an alternative to constructivist thought and in particular 
to the concept of pre-determined identities. Poststructuralism questions the dichotomous nature 
of constructivist identity construction. Poststructuralist identity construction originates in 
discourse and exists only within discourse. All identities - both the self and the other are seen as 
complex.  Poststructionalists advocate identity as defined by multiple others and otherness can be 
defined by a variety of means such as difference or enmity.  
There are a number of different definitions of othering, in different schools of thought. In 
sociology, anthropology and cultural geography it is usually understood as a “a process (…) 
through which identities are set up in an unequal relationship”7. Other scholars see othering as 
strictly dichotomous – the self is to the other what friend is to enemy8 or alternatively where a 
group of people is described as fundamentally different from group.
9
 Othering in this Thesis can 
be understood as: a discursive practice of identity construction where the self is divided from the 
other through varying degree of difference.  
 
                                                     
6
 Wiberg, Håkan (2000) Security Communities: Emmanuel Adler, Michael Barnett and Anomalous 
Northerners Cooperation and Conflict, Vol 35 (3) pp 289 -298: 291 
7
 Crang, Mike (1998) Cultural Geography. Routledge, London: 61 
8
 Bauman, Zygmunt (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence Cornell University Press, New York: 8 
9
 Can Other be Used as a Verb: ”Other”, a verb that sets itself apart Merriam –Webster.com  
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/other-as-a-verb (accessed 3.8.2017) 
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1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The Thesis is divided into five chapters, following the introduction. The second chapter outlines 
the theoretical framework. The reason for starting with the theoretical framework, rather than the 
historical context is that the theoretical premises permeate the understanding of Nordic identity – 
also historically. The first chapter also provides an overview of the methodology.  
The third chapter provides the historical context. Using the theoretical framework, a historical 
overview of Nordic identity construction is outlined. There is particular focus the Cold War 
period, also known as the golden era of Nordic cooperation, as well as the end of the Cold War. 
The chapter finishes with an overview of the discourses regarding Nordic cooperation, in 
particular within security and defence policies prior to the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the primary data and the results of the analysis. There is an 
overview of each primary source and each respective discourse relating to Russia. This chapter 
follows a more comparative approach, in regard to how each source of primary data defines 
security and engages in discourses of othering. This allows for a summary of all the discourses 
the Nordic countries resort to in their discussions about Russia.  
The fifth chapter represents the discussions and the application of the results of the research. The 
chapter focuses on the analysis of how Russia is portrayed in discourse to contribute to a 
changing Nordic identity. The chapter places Nordic identity within a global context, amongst 
other organizations. The discussion ranges from a critique of the Nordic cooperation to 
contemplations of the potential forms of Nordic cooperation.   
The closing chapter concludes the Thesis. Global developments otherwise not included in this 
Thesis, and their impact on Nordic identity is discussed. Finally, the potential and future 
prospects of Nordic cooperation are considered.  
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2. Theoretical Framework  
2.1. Discourse à la Mode 
 
Since the “linguistic turn” in social sciences, discourse has been increasingly scrutinised by a 
growing number of scholars. The study and analysis of discourse reached the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) in the 1990s, with scholars such as Iver B Neumann, Andrew 
Linklater and David Campbell. The focus on discourse coincided with the end of the Cold War, 
and the failure of rationalist theories to predict the collapse of the bipolar system. The reactions 
to the new world system and the failure of the rationalist theories were varied. Some claimed, 
like Francis Fukuyama (1989) in The End of History
10
  that it was the end of mankind’s socio-
cultural development and evolution. Other scholars, like the widely read Samuel Huntington 
(1993) advocated for a more regional approach in his essay Clash of Civilisations
11
. Alex Wendt, 
brought the constructivist approach into the discipline around the same time, claiming that 
“anarchy is what states makes of it”12. These have become classics in IR. A reaction to 
constructivists stating that constructivism is a compromise between rationalist and post-
modernist accounts
13
, was born in poststructuralism. Poststructuralism took the focus on 
discourse a step further than the constructivists, stating that it is where reality originates. The 
following section will outline the theoretical premises of poststructuralism before delving into 
the application of the theory.  
2.2.  Poststructuralist discourse theory  
 
Poststructuralist theory is a discourse theory, drawing on Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis of 
the link between discourse and knowledge. Derrida’s deconstruction, the intertextuality of 
Kristeva and Laclau’s and Mouffe’s writing on discourse and hegemony constitute the building 
blocks of poststructuralist discourse theory. The poststructuralist view is that language is 
ontologically productive (reality is constructed there), epistemologically discursive (language is 
                                                     
10
 Fukuyama, Francis (1989): The End of History? The National Interest (16): 3–18 
11
 Huntington, Samuel (1993): The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993 
12
 Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy is what States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power 
Politics. International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425. 
13
 Adler, Emmanuel (1997): Seizing the middle ground. European Journal of International Relations, Vol 
.3: 319  
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a way of knowing), and relationally structured
14
. Language is seen as a network or a system of 
signs where meaning is understood by what it is not, through a pattern of juxtapositions. 
Language is social because people are socialised to understanding meaning and political because 
all meaning can be contested. Full stability or fixity of meaning is not possible, but neither is 
absolute non-fixity
15
. This Thesis draws its theoretical premises from Hansen’s understanding of 
poststructuralist discourse theory as introduced in her work; Security as Practice: Discourse 
Analysis and the Bosnian War.  
 
2.2.1. Ontology, epistemology and structure 
 
Postructuralism sees discourse as ontologically productive. This means that all meaning, 
including identities is constructed in discourse and indeed no identity exists prior to discourse.  
This is unlike constructivist theory, which sees some identities as pre-existent to language. The 
most well-renown constructivist Wendt argues that states have corporate identities that are 
defined prior to discourse; a pre-social identity. He for example claims that “democracy” is such 
an identity.
16
 Wendt’s idea that two states, when they interact for the first time, already have 
predetermined identities is strongly rejected by the poststructuralist school of thought. Rather, an 
identity may seem very fixed because the discourse has been dominant for so long, however it is 
always generated in discourse.  
 
For all meaning to be generated in discourse, it also hence means that in the search for meaning 
(i.e. identity) one must study language. In turn, this means that there is no objective truth in 
discourse. For poststructuralists, the epistemology is hence both discursive and relativist
17
. This 
does not provide an obstacle in the study of meaning in discourse; meaning can be evaluated 
                                                     
14
 Hansen, L. (2006): Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. Routledge, London: 
20 
15
 Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal (2014, 2
nd
 ed.): Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. Verso, New York; London: 111 
16
 Wendt, Alexander (1999): Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 224–8 
17
 Shapiro, Michael J. (1981): Language and political understanding: the politics of discursive practices. 
New Haven, Yale University Press: 218 
10 
 
 
 
against other criteria than truthfulness, such as for example clarity, usefulness and applicability.
18
 
 
Poststructionalists reject constructivism’s identities based on binary opposition19.  Wendt 
described it in the following way; identity formation and change is a process through which the 
ego (self) presents the alter (other) with a new identity, which the alter can accept or refuse, and 
that the contestation over the identity remains between the two, the alter and the ego
20
. Rather, 
postructionalists like Campbell, Connolly and Hansen, advocate that the self can be constructed 
through a variety of non-Selves.
21
 Each non-self is defined by varying degree of difference rather 
than radical Otherness (enmity). Postructuralism, unlike constructivism adopts a differential and 
referential view of language.
22
 Meanings are seen to exist within a system of meanings. In this 
system, meanings, and hence also identities are connected to each other through two processes; 
linking and differentiation. Linking allows for the creation of “us” while differentiation creates 
“them”. They occur simultaneously and together they constitute identity construction.23 They 
cannot exist independently.  
 
2.2.2. Foreign Policy, National Identity and Security 
 
When identity is conceptualised as political, social and relational, foreign policy can be 
understood as an articulation of other(s) in opposition to a self. The self is constantly redefined in 
relation to others through processes of securitisation and desecuritisation.
24
 
 
Foreign policy 
constitutes the official state discourse, articulated by the government, and hence where the 
                                                     
18
 Potter, Jonathan (1996): Discourse analysis and constructionist approaches: Theoretical background. In: 
John T. E. Richardson: Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social sciences. 
British Psychological Society, Leicester, England 
19
 Jensen, Sune Qvotrup (2011): Othering, identity formation and agency. Qualitative Studies; 2(2): 63-
78: 66 
20
 Wendt, Alexander (1987):  The agent-structure problem in international relations theory. International 
Organization, vol. 41, no. 3: 335 - 65 
21
 Hansen, 2006: 37 
22
 Hansen, Lene & Waever, Ole (2002): European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of 
the Nordic States. Routledge, London: 24 
23
 Hansen, 2006: 18 
24
 Leek, Maria & Morozov, Viacheslav (2016): Identity beyond Othering: Crisis and the Politics of 
Decision in the EU’s Involvement in Libya. Paper for conference of Central and East European 
International Studies Association in Ljubljana 2016:  http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/CEEISA-
ISA-LBJ2016/Archive/5d240e29-49e5-4a33-98dd-8d4d4b30c130.pdf (accessed March 2017): 10 
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official national identity is constructed. The government discourse can to a greater or lesser 
extent be challenged by opposition parties, the media, public opinion and popular culture.  
 
In the construction of national identity, security is an essential component. Security, like all other 
concepts in poststructuralist theory, is seen as socially constructed in discourse. In security 
discourses, the self is identified and a threat is securitised, from which the self needs to be 
secured.
25
 This allows for the differentiation between the (national) self and the other and in 
international relations. It is facilitated by the Westphalian international order, where sovereign, 
equal states exist in an anarchic space, where the “inside”, i.e. the domestic is juxtaposed with 
the “outside.”26 For a long time the idea existed within IR, that an enemy was needed to secure 
the existence of a state. Enemies had to be constructed, if none emerged naturally. The end of the 
Cold War proved that the construction of a national identity was not dependent on a radical 
enemy. Rather, the understanding grew, along with the increased focus in discourse studies, that 
the ontological identity depends on the exterior is in some way or other being different from the 
interior.   
 
There are a number of strategies employed within discourse to secure this ontological identity, 
through constructing difference. Browning and Joenniemi identify the following ontological 
security-seeking strategies
27
 which are securitisation, desecuritisation and asecuritisation.   
Securitisation, first coined by Ole Waever, challenges the traditional realist understanding of 
security as either objective (a real threat to security) and subjective (perceived as a threat).
28
  
Waever sees security as speech act, where a certain issues (such as climate change, violations of 
air space or militarization) are portrayed as a threat. Difference is often instrumental in processes 
of securitising another country or group of people. Desecuritisation is essentially the opposite – it 
is a speech act where certain issues are purposely not portrayed as a threat. The European Union 
                                                     
25
 Bellamy, Alex (2004): Security Communities and Their neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global 
Integrators Palgrave Macmillan, United Kingdom: 57 
26
 Hansen, 2006: 30 
27
 Browning, Christopher S. & Joenniemi, Pertti (2012): From fratricide to security community: re-
theorising difference in the constitution of Nordic peace. Journal of International Relations and 
Development, Vol. 16, no.4 pages 483 – 513: 494 
28
 Van Munster, Rens (2012): Securitisation in Oxford Bibliographies,  26 June 2012 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-
0091.xml;jsessionid=3C3B6A5E9E3169538AE0573C10CBEFFB (accessed 1.8.2017)  
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and European integration overall is often considered a prime example of desecurition. 
Differences and perceptions of threats were purposely set aside. Difference also ceases to be a 
radical constitutive of identity
29
. Finally asecuritisation, which also covers Hansen’s notion of 
fading, means deleting notions of security from discourses upholding ontological security
30
 by 
abandoning difference as a constitutive of identity
31
. It means adopting an ontological identity 
where the one accepts the “given ambiguity, difference and inherently fragmentary nature of 
identity”32. This definition can be understood as poststructuralist view on identity.  
 
In discussions about national identity and national security, the critics of poststructuralism tend 
to argue about the material factors – if a state decides to move troops to the border or shoot down 
a plane this is not a discourse but an action. Lene Hansen draws on Critical Discourse Analyst 
Norman Fairclough in discussing this
33
; not all language needs to be verbal
34
. An action can also 
be understood as a type of discourse.  The manner in which these actions are portrayed in speech 
is the focus of poststructionalism; material things like say an airplane, made of steel and 
weighing several tons can either be a war machine or a tool of humanitarian assistance for 
performing airdrops. It is the discourse that defines the airplane.  
2.3. The Region in a Theoretical Perspective  
 
The region has only emerged as an area of study in International Relations at a later stage. The 
regional identity is less fixed than a national one and can be reconstructed in multiple ways. The 
region is often denoted within discourses of national identity, but can also be constructed in 
discourses of regional authorities or institutions, in popular culture and media. The more 
established the institutions are the less there is fluidity to what constitutes the region. It is 
constructed in the same manner, through the identification of others – defined by difference, 
alterity and enmity. The choice of primary data for this Thesis; the national governmental reports 
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means that the regional identity under scrutiny; the Nordic identity is a by-product in the 
construction of the national one.  
 
Regional security has been theorised in different manners – Adler and Barnett built on the 
Deutschian concept of a security community, which is understood as community where the use 
of violence has been virtually excluded and the possibility of war becomes unthinkable
35
. Adler 
and Barnett claimed that a security community is defined by shared identities, values and 
meanings, direct interactions and reciprocal long-term interests.
36
 They represent the traditional 
understanding of difference: the more shared values, norms and culture, the more stable the 
security community. 
37
This leads to the understanding that similarity creates stability while 
difference represents conflict. Bellamy has further discussed in detail the relations between 
security communities and their neighbours, through a constructivist IR lens
38
. All these 
approaches share the notion that a shared idea of an external threat or perceived threat is needed 
for the existence of a security community.  Poststructuralists oppose this binary view of 
difference, but rather advocated for a varying degrees of difference that co-exist.  
 
Rather, in the poststructuralist approach, one can apply Waever and Buzan’s regional security 
complex theory (RSCT).
39
 RSCT slots well into poststructuralist thought, allowing for a 
multitude of others, defined by varying degrees of difference. States within a security complex 
can have different relations to those inside and to those outside. According to Waever and 
Buzan, security complexes are shaped by patterns of amity and enmity as well as power 
relations
40
, yet these are not necessarily the same as outside the regional security complex. It 
became more relevant with the collapse of the bipolar Cold War system, where the focus on 
different regions increased, when the bipolarity did not permeate every single security discourse. 
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RSCT is particularly applicable to Norden as its identity has often been defined, in relation to the 
larger world order, yet difference exists within the region.  
2.4.  Othering as a Theoretical Concept – a Historical Overview  
 
Poststructuralism as a theory is today still very new, however the Other in academia has 
prevailed since the Ancient Greek philosophers. Aristotle wrote “the self-sufficing man will 
require friendship in order to know himself”41 this is because he saw a friend as another self, 
through which one could gain self-knowledge
42
. In Ancient Greek the Other we by the Barbarian 
or the Savage during the 17
th
 century. In the 21
st
 century it has been translated to “(radical) 
alterity”43.  Othering has been covered in multiple disciplines, including, but not limited to 
sociology, anthropology and critical theory.
44
 
 
In modern times, scholars have drawn on Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. An example is Simone 
de Beauvoir in her defining work The Second Sex (1949), where the male is defined as 
privileged, who systematically oppresses women by defining them as the Other
45
. She presents 
how the dominant part (the men) defines meaning through discourse, which in turn allows for the 
repression of the marginalised. Another classical example is Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), 
where the Orient is defined as irrational, psychologically weak, feminine and non-European as 
opposed to the rational, psychologically strong and masculine Britain or West
46
.  Spivak was the 
first person to apply Othering systematically to her research, in her study of third world women 
in India in 1985
47
. What made her study particularly significant is the existence of layered 
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Othering, or its intersectionality and multidimensionality. She understood Othering as classed, 
raced and gendered, creating a system of interlocked webs of oppression
48
.  
 
Drawing on Said’s example, one can visualise the system of meanings created through othering 
like this. This also shows how the processes of linking and differentiation take place. The same 
form of visualisation will be used to exemplify the Nordic identity.  
 
Figure 1: Identity construction – Britain and the Orient 
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The figure
49
 above provides an example of how of how identity is constructed through the 
relational character of language. This is to be understood as a fractional segment of the entire 
system that constitutes language.  
 
2.4.1. Conceptualising Difference  
 
Difference is usually intrinsically tied to the understanding of othering. In her introduction to her 
book Portraying the other in IR Sybille Reinke de Buitrago writes “I see representations of 
difference inseparably linked with othering, both being a regular part of interaction between 
states, groups and individuals”50. Postructuralism sees a more complex representation of the self, 
where the self is defined by multiple Others, with varying levels of difference.  
 
The constructivist notion that difference represents threat, like in the Deustchian security 
community is rejected by poststructuralist scholars. If one looks at past conflicts, it is usually the 
most similar neighbours that engage in conflict, in particular in ethnic conflicts, where identity 
politics play an important role. Drawing on psychology and psychoanalysis, one can see that this 
it does not make sense to approach difference as an inevitable threat, 
51
 since it is not always 
difference that leads to enmity. It is groups that struggle in their understanding of self (i.e. 
ontological security), that will strengthen their identities through emphasising difference.
52
 This 
is what Freud calls the ‘narcissism of minor differences’, that is to say that identity is “based on 
subtle distinctions that are emphasised, defended and reinforced against what is closest because 
that is what poses the greatest threat.
53 
Hence, seeing difference as inevitably leading to enmity 
provides for only a shallow understanding of identity. 
 
 
Strategies of othering include previously mentioned ontology-seeking strategies. Some 
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poststructuralist scholars, like Thomas Diez, in his analysis of Europe as a normative power, 
denotes in more details the strategies. He identifies four strategies of othering
54
:  
 
1) The representation of the other as an existential threat. This is the same as securitisation. 
These forms of discourses allow for the legitimisation of extraordinary measures.  
2) The representation of the other as inferior. This form of othering, has more similarities 
with Orientalism. 
55
 Difference does not have the same radicalism to it as securitisation.  
It is only when the inferior starts to endanger the identity of the self that it surpasses into 
the aforementioned category.  
3) The representation of the other as violating universal principles. Diez sees this form of 
othering as stronger (i.e. difference is underlined more) than the second strategy, because 
not not only is the other seen as inferior, but the self’s superiority is based on universal 
validity, which the other should attain or achieve, meanwhile the “universal” values 
remain unquestioned
56
. Hansen calls this ethical othering
57
 
4) The representation of the other as different. This remains the most ‘innocent’58strategy, 
even though, one must not forget, it still imposes identities upon others.  
 
Diez calls this a typology for othering. It provides the basis for the analysis of the primary data.  
 
2.4.2. The Role of the Past: Temporal Othering 
 
Waever’s concept of temporal othering was a turning point in the literature on othering in IR. 
Waever wrote that the EU had been constructed in discourse through temporal othering of its 
own past. In other words, there was no enemy image in the construction of Europe. The enemy 
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image was the European war-torn past, which at all costs was to be avoided.
59
 The purpose for 
European integration is to avoid the former conflict-ridden Europe. It is important to note, that 
the temporal other is not the only other, and it co-exists with alternative spatial others. In 
particular democratic identities are often defined through spatial difference as well as temporal 
difference
60
. Despite the democratic states today being mostly peaceful, a majority of them have 
a conflict-ridden past. They use this past to project a peaceful identity, because it is what they are 
not anymore.  
 
The past is not only important as an other, but also because of the role history plays in shaping 
discourse. Foreign policy is always drawing on both contemporary discourses as well as 
historical ones
61
 – foreign policy discourses are indeed placed within a historical one, through 
references to development, progress, backwardness. 
62
 Official foreign policy discourses are 
framed as progression from one temporal identity to another. Past identities of other entities are 
also often referred.  
2.5. Methodology: Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis  
 
The purpose of the poststructuralist discourse analysis is to discern and distinguish certain 
strands, which lead to discoveries of several discourses. These discourses, when perceived 
through the poststructuralist lens, provide an understanding of the self through the identification 
of the numbers of others constructed within and through the discourse. Poststructuralist discourse 
theory, like other discourse theories, is neither qualitative nor quantitative – rather it questions 
the assumptions of qualitative and quantitative methods completely. Discourse analysis is a 
deconstructive reading or interpretation of a speech act. The goal is to distinguish more subtle 
nuances and identities through the meticulous study of the setting and the process where meaning 
is created. In the case of this Thesis, the data is where the national identity is constructed, and the 
regional Nordic identity emerges as a by-product. The methodology draws on the theoretical 
framework and Hansen’s methodology in Security as a Practice.  
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The methodology consists of first identifying the central themes of the text. Once, the themes 
have been coded different strands can be distinguished. The following step is the identification of 
articulations of meaning or identity. These are significantly shorter statements, which can consist 
from everything from a word to longer sentences, within the strands. These are often shorter 
sentences or depictions of the self or the other which contribute to a discourse strand. 
Articulations of identity are not always blatantly clear. Rather, the use of literary devices is often 
employed, ranging from similes and metaphors to patterns of transitivity, the use of active or 
passive voices and cohesion devices.
63
 The structure of the text itself can also be seen as a part of 
the articulation of identity. Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality, for example through the use of 
direct quotations, can be used to articulate identity.
64
 Each articulation exists within a web, or a 
system of signs
65
, when several articulations and hence processes of linking and differentiation 
have been identified, one can discern the strategies of othering. Processes of linking and 
differentiation can be studied separately; they together constitute the process of identity 
construction
66
. The final step is gaining deeper understanding of the system of signs and where a 
meaning places itself in regard to other meanings.  
 
The goal of the poststructuralist discourse analysis is hence the identification discursive 
articulations of self or other through processes of linking and differentiation, and how they 
constitute the discourse that solidifies certain identities. It includes the identification of spatial, 
temporal and ethical constructions of identity.  
 
 
 
 
2.5.1 Limitations of the poststructuralist discourse analysis methodology 
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Advocates of rational theories will criticise the non-causal epistemology of poststructuralist 
discourse analysis. Constructivists even, tend to accept to some extent a causal relationship 
between identity and policy. Poststructuralism on the other hand, acquiesces that identity and 
policy are mutually constitutive. Drawing on Hansen; the non-causal epistemology indeed 
doesn’t exclude “empirical analyses of ‘real world relevance,’ or systematic assessments of data 
and methodology.”67 A thorough analysis is hence possible, despite the non-causal epistemology, 
in particular because the aim of the research question is a deeper understanding of identity and 
not how identity informs certain actions.  
 
If identity is understood as constructed through processes of linking and differentiating, the 
reliability of one reader’s judgement may differ from another reader’s.  Would another 
researcher come to a different result? The methodology, of critically identifying how signs are 
linked and juxtaposed should take place in an as empirical manner as possible. It is worth noting 
that poststructuralist discourse analysis allows for a multiple readability of texts.
68
 
 
Limitations tied to the researcher are more specific. The most prominent challenge is the fact that 
the data is in four different languages. The Finnish report is the only one which is also published 
in English; others only include summaries in English. The other texts are in Swedish, Norwegian 
and Danish respectively. As a native Swedish speaker, I have no trouble understanding and 
processing Danish and Norwegian text, however to distinguish smaller nuances may prove to be 
more challenging. The second challenge is the personal convictions of the researcher and how 
they affect the research. It is worth nothing that the researcher is of Finnish nationality, and has 
Western convictions.  
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3. Historical Context 
 
This chapter aims to provide a historical context of the Nordic region, with particular focus on 
identity creation and othering. Focus is placed on the Cold War period and the construction of 
Nordic identity during that period. The chapter ends with the early developments of Nordic 
security and defence cooperation and the Nordic identity discourses employed prior to the 
Russian illegal annexation of Crimea.  
 
3.1.  Vikings of Norden and so on  
 
The Scandinavian Peninsula was first inhabited around 10 000 years ago after the first Ice Age. 
Christianity reached the region of Northern European around 500 AD. The Viking era took place 
in the late Iron Age from 700 A.D. to 1100. The Vikings put the region on the European map, as 
Scandinavians gained a reputation as vicious, barbaric and conflict-prone.
69
 After the separation 
of the church, there was an increased interest in Northern Europe, which was still considered a 
heathen part of Europe. The region generally remained excluded from the religion wars that 
shook the continent.
70
 
 
The reputation of a warring region of barbarians was maintained throughout the middle Ages. In 
the five centuries preceding 1814, the Nordic states engaged in around 60 wars with each other. 
The region was defined by conflict, both intra-Nordic and with their neighbours.
71
 Browning and 
Joenniemi referred to the region as a fratricide prior to 1815 in their influential article on Nordic 
Peace.
 72
 Discourses on Nordic identity would often recall on a brutal and sometimes even primal 
identity of a Gothic Scandinavian warrior society.
73
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From its modern genesis, the Nordic region has been defined and portrayed in contrast to its 
neighbours. Geopolitically, the region has been defined by two securitised borders – the Eastern 
one and the Southern one. The Nordic countries engaged in wars with the neighbours, but 
equally often the neighbours engaged in other conflicts. There were multiple wars between 
Sweden and Tsarist Russia with two periods when Finland (belonging to Sweden) was occupied 
by Russia
74
. Both times the Swedes abandoned the Finns to defend mainland Sweden. These 
events contributed to the cementation of Norden’s Eastern border. Furthermore, the Nordic 
Germanic languages were contrasted against the Slavic one, free peasantry was opposed to 
serfdom and the constitutional monarchies as opposed to tsarist regimes.
75
 Already in the 18
th
 
century, Norden was seen as fundamentally different from its European neighbours in the South, 
since it non-Catholic, non-colonial and non-imperial. 
76
The Slavic East and the Prussian South 
were non-democratic states, under authoritarian rule, which was contrasted with the Nordic 
countries. The narratives were not always such that Norden was explicitly seen as non-Russian 
or non-German/Prussian. Nevertheless, the region was portrayeds as different.
77
 The anti-
Russian rhetoric has been particularly common in Finland and Sweden, which anti-Europe has 
been more significant in Denmark and Norway. Prior to the 20
th
 century the region was defined 
by shifting borders and defined by traditional security concerns with the kingdoms of Sweden 
and Denmark engaging in balance of power practices.  
 
The exception to this warring identity was the Kalmar Union, which united Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark between 1397 and 1521. Due to the focus on national accounts of history, in particular 
among historians from Nordic countries, the Kalmar Union time has been profiled as an 
exception or anomaly. 
78
Further on, it however provided a base to build more pan-Scandinavian 
discourses, both during the 19th century but also in more recent times.
79
 The Kalmar Union was 
                                                     
74
 These periods were called: Stora ofreden 1713-21 and lilla ofreden 1742-43. Stora och lilla  ofreden 
(1985): Uppslagsverket Finland :http://www.nykarlebyvyer.nu/sidor/texter/prosa/uppslfinl/storaofr.htm 
Acccessed 7.8.2017 
75 Hilson, Mary (2008): The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945. Reaktion, London: 19 
76 Hilson, 2008: 16 
77
 Joenniemi, Pentti (1992): Norden as a Mystery: The Search for New Roads into the Future. In Öberg, 
Jan (ed.)  Nordic Security in the 1990’s: Options in the Changing Europe Pinter Publishers Limited, 
London: pp 35 – 84:  46 
78
 Hilson, 2008: 14 
79
  Hilson, 2008: 14 
23 
 
 
 
indeed an exception in terms of security cooperation. The Union was based on the Letter of the 
Union, which consisted of the five defining principles
80
 for the Union. One of them approached 
security and stated. “If one of the kingdoms is threatened by war, the remaining kingdoms shall 
provide assistance.”81 This remains the single most comprehensive form of security cooperation 
ever agreed upon between the Nordic countries.  
 
3.2. From Battlefield to Negative Peace  
 
Despite the balance of power and rather tense relations, the region was defined by similarity in 
its transition to modernity. The region consisted of two early modern states: Denmark (which 
included Norway) and Sweden (which included Finland), in which the Reformation had a very 
similar hold, the role of the Lutheran Church was significant, and their progression into modern 
states happened at approximately the same time. Furthermore, it is notable that this took place in 
a rather peaceful manner
82
, in particular in comparison to central Europe. After 1815, a negative 
peace emerged through the establishment of a no-war community. 
83
Due to the region’s conflict-
ridden past the peace was negative one. Johan Galtung first defined negative peace as the 
“absence of war” and positive peace as the “integration of human society”84. Their further 
development into security communities has then been addressed by Deutsch, Adler and Barnett. 
Norden developed gradually into a security community.  
 
3.3.  Security Community  
 
The Kalmar Union agreement’s reference to collective security remains an exception and an 
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anomaly, because collective security has never since occurred between the Nordic countries. 
This became clear, in 1864, when the dream of a Scandinavian security alliance died. The 
Swedish King Karl XV failed to meet his promise of providing assistance to the Danes against 
the Prussians. King Karl XV had made a promise to send 20 000 troops to help Denmark defend 
itself against the Prussian invasion. In not coming to the Danes’ assistance a clear message was 
sent that the Nordic neighbours could not be relied on in security matters. The security 
dimension was hereby excluded from Nordic cooperation. Nordic cooperation and the Nordic 
identity were hence permitted to progress without a security dimension. The Kalmar Union and 
the Scandinavism that it entailed did contributed to the construction of a security community 
without the security dimension. Indeed many scholars claim that 1864 signified the end of the 
pan-Scandinavian dream, however it was only the death of it with the security dimension. Nordic 
cooperation continued to develop, and as Hemstad writes in her book Fra Indian Summer till 
nordisk vinter, there was a peak in voluntary Nordic cooperation around the turn of the century
85
. 
The dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden in 1905 was a proof of a dispute 
being solved peacefully, despite forcing much of Nordic cooperation on hold.  
 
Nordic cooperation truly took shape in the 20th century, through cooperation in international 
organisations. The joint neutrality policy during World War One is an example of joint Nordic 
foreign policy. Nordic cooperation existed prior to the First World War, but it was during the 
Interwar Period that cooperation grew, in the League of Nations and the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) just to mention a few. This cooperation contributed to a shared Nordic 
identity, as the Nordic countries acted like a bloc within these organisations and were often 
treated as a unit. In the League of Nations this has sometimes been referred to as the Genevese 
construction of Norden.
86
 Götz uses as an example the following citation: “You from the 
Scandinavian countries seem [like] blue-eyed angels to us”87 to exemplify how foreign 
discourses about the Nordic countries shaped the Nordic identity. Even though the Nordic 
countries have always emphasised their differences in the cooperation in international 
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organisations, their similarities were more often than not contrasted against more radical 
difference, such as mainland Europe. Their awareness of their shared heritage increased in these 
international conferences. 
88
At the same time when Finland engaged in cooperation with its 
neighbours the region was increasingly called Norden, as opposed to Scandinavia.
89
 Prior to the 
outbreak of World War Two, there were a number of disputes about borders, the most significant 
of them about the Åland Islands, between Finland and Sweden. More notable is the fact however, 
that it was dealt with in a peaceful manner (actually one of the few successes of the League of 
Nations). This dispute further confirmed the idea that intra-Nordic relations were no longer 
viewed as anarchic
90
, and borders were no longer a source of military dispute.  
 
The outbreak of World War Two proved the extent to which the security dimension was absent 
from Nordic cooperation. At a certain point during World War Two, Finland was allied with the 
power that occupied both Denmark and Norway. Due to the absence of the security dimension, 
the Nordic cooperation remained sustainable. This opposes the view of Adler and Barnett that a 
shared enemy is necessary for the development of a security community. Nordic cooperation was 
despite the different experiences during the war, able to reach new heights after the end of it. 
This reflects a defining characteristic of Nordic cooperation. Norden has remained intrinsically 
different from Europe, because there has never been a shared threat to the region, (or the 
region’s identity) from the outside91 and neither have the countries themselves engaged in intra- 
Nordic warfare (in modern times). Instead, each state has had separate threats to national 
security.  
  
3.4.  The Cold War: the Golden Years of Nordic Cooperation 
 
The different experiences during World War Two led the Nordic countries to seek different 
security arrangements. There were some attempts to establish a Scandinavian Defence Union at 
the end of World War Two. Due to the countries separate security concerns, the plans fell 
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through and they all sought separate guarantees for their national securities, strongly based on 
their experiences during the war and neo-realist policies. Norway and Denmark, who had been 
invaded by Nazi Germany, decided to become founding NATO members in 1949, along with 
Iceland. In doing so, they bandwagoned with the USA. Similarly, Finland bandwagoned with the 
USSR, mainly for purposes of pure self-preservation. Meanwhile, heated debate was undertaken 
in Sweden regarding NATO membership, but the country chose to maintain its neutrality policy. 
In doing so they created a balance in the region, between the two superpowers of the Cold War.  
 
During these early post-war years, the seeds for Cold War Nordic cooperation were planted. 
Nordic cooperation was to bloom over the coming decades. The manners in which the Nordic 
countries sought security guarantees also encouraged an interest in Nordic cooperation. For 
Finland, Norden became its gateway to the West, in its attempt to not succumb completely to the 
Soviet sphere of influence. Denmark, Norway, and to a lesser extent Iceland, used Nordic 
cooperation as way to balance their own interests and NATO memberships. Finally, Sweden 
turned to Nordic cooperation, seeking to justify its neutrality policy and to find support for it. 
Norden was defined by its exceptional character during the Cold War – it was a low-tension area 
and highly progressive, depicted as mediators between East and West
92
. This exceptionalism 
lasted the length of the Cold War, and was strengthened by the Nordic countries themselves 
using this brand of Nordic exceptionalism as a foreign policy instrument.
93
 Cold War 
cooperation was also pragmatic, developed as a way to make life simpler for the Nordic people. 
Cooperation between the organised labour movements, consisting of both trade unions and the 
social democratic parties, contributed to the cooperation. The developments, such as the Passport 
Union, the Nordic Council and the Council of Ministers put the Norden at the forefront of 
regional development.  
 
3.4.1. The Nordic model – a social model and a foreign policy tool 
 
The Nordic welfare model was seen as a defining factor of Nordic identity during the Cold War. 
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It was represented as a third way, placed between communism and capitalism. Even though the 
region was understood as a “Third Way” it was never understood as a fully-established third 
point
94
 – it did not represent a third pole, but rather it existed within the dualism of the Cold War 
system. It did not exist in complete juxtaposition to either opposing system. The Cold War not 
only shaped Nordic identity, but it also influenced Nordic cooperation itself. Cooperation was 
defined according to the lowest common denominator
95
 and remained limited due to the bipolar 
character of the Cold War. There were many “Grand Designs” for Nordic cooperation which fell 
through. However, the so called Nordic phoenix effect ensured that there was always progress 
made – the failure of a Grand Design, for example NordSat, led to deepened cooperation 
nevertheless. The Cold War allowed the Nordic cooperation to develop in “soft” areas, such as 
social policy, care and education, in which they often applied very similar national policies. This 
exceptional character of the region allowed for an identity which was depicted as superior and 
the Nordic model was considered a goal for other countries. Norden was in the most general 
terms, regularly portrayed as better.
96
 
 
The Nordic model was not only a social model; it was also a foreign policy model, where the 
Nordic countries took on the role as bridge-builders and peacemakers.
97
 They took on the role as 
mediators between East and West, but they also used this identity to promote consensual 
democratic values in the organisations in which they were members, to promote anti-militarism 
and nuclear disarmament
98
. Furthermore, this peaceful characteristic was strengthened through 
their international solidarity, where the Nordic countries as a bloc championed for the rights of 
all countries to develop without external interference. Similarly, the region was the first to reach 
the UN Official Development Assistance target of 0.7% of GDP.
99
 This foreign policy tool was 
of course one of necessity as well, due to the size of the Nordic countries.  
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3.4.2. The Cold War Others  
 
During the Cold War, the region was able to construct an identity for itself through multiple 
others. The backwardness of the Soviet Union was used to propel Norden to become an epitome 
of advancement (through the Nordic Model)
100
 while simultaneously the ontological security of 
the region was consolidated through its difference to Europe. Europe was during the Cold War 
defined by high-tensions and an area of friction between the two superpowers. Indeed; “the very 
existence of the Cold War was among the preconditions for upholding the [Nordic] self-image 
because it was defined … by contrast.”101 Waever and Wiberg argue that during the Cold War, 
Norden was a sub-regional security community, within a larger security complex (Europe), 
which in turn was defined by a bipolar superpower security complex. Rather than constructing an 
identity in opposition to either communism or capitalism, the identity was constructed within the 
Cold War bipolar global system.  
 
The Cold War bipolar system also created the so called Nordic balance. This meant that the 
Nordic countries maintained the region as a low-tension one. It consisted of mutual restraint and 
the idea of keeping their “own” superpower out, to avoid the escalation of tensions in the region 
between the superpowers.
102
 It required the Nordic states to work in tandem, essentially taking 
into consideration, also their neighbours’ security, in their own security policies103. Further it 
allowed the region to develop an identity through its alterity to Europe, an area of high-tension 
(see figure 2). Norden has often been described as an anomaly; a region where traditional power 
politics cannot be applied
104
.The Cold War allowed for a Nordic identity, as exceptional, 
peaceful and advanced. 
 
Figure 2: Nordic identity and its alterity to Europe during the Cold War 
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3.5.  “The Nordic Model is dead”  
 
The end of the Cold War signified an end to the structure within which Norden had been allowed 
to flourish. It also signified the time of a united Europe and deeper European integration. Esko 
Aho claimed in 1997 that “The Nordic Model is dead”105 while the Swedish Prime Minister 
accurately put into words, why the third way was seen as redundant: “No one wants to be a 
compromise between a system which has turned out to be a success and another that has turned 
out to be a historic catastrophe.”106 The Nordic identity was shunned as a Cold War construct, 
Norden “lost its nature as a borderline case and its character as an entity out of the ordinary.”107 
The economic depression that hit the Nordic countries and Finland in particular highlighted the 
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notion that the Nordic model was not the solution anymore. Nordic cooperation was considered 
pointless to the extent that the Nordic Council itself published a book about the death of 
Norden.
108
  
 
When seen through the poststructuralist lens where identity is relational, it becomes evident that 
Norden experienced a significant ontological crisis at the end of the Cold War. Already in the 
peaceful revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe challenged the Nordic identity, simply because 
they were peaceful.
109
 The European project grew into one of history’s greatest peace projects 
and the Nordic peace ceased to be exceptional. Europe ceased to be the meeting point between 
East and West, and Norden lost its identity as a low-tension area. Many European countries 
adopted system of social welfare and the Nordic Model as a “third way” ceased to exist. Norden, 
as a discursive practice, was at the mercy of new discourses, which provided less stability than 
the former East-West ones.
110
  
 
In the post-Cold War order, the NATO-Russia Council was founded and the identity as a bridge-
builders and mediators between East and West became insignificant.
111
  After 9/11 the focus of 
the world turned to the Middle-East and the geopolitical significance for their role as mediators, 
decreased further. Solidarity for other countries became from Gdansk’s shipyard onwards, 
became a European characteristic, rather than a Nordic one.  
 
During the post-Cold War era, the borders of the region became porous as the discourses that 
gave the region its identity had ceased to exist. Baltic became the new Nordic, as cooperation 
became over the Baltic Sea was preferable to the traditional state-to-state form of cooperation in 
the Nordic Council.
112
 Region building approaches were popular and some attempts were even 
made to rename the entire region as Northern Europe, some discourses even including Russia in 
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it, and the Baltic Sea Region was referred to as a mega-region, by Joenniemi.
113
 Another 
poignant example is The Northern Dimension, as introduced by Paavo Lipponen at the Barents 
region international conference in 1997, which called for cooperation between EU and Russia in 
the North
114
. There was a form of identity fluidity that reigned over Europe as new states were 
born, and a reshuffling of former identities took place. This was also the case with Russia at this 
time period. Russia gained the identity as a learner or apprentice
115
 that wanted to enter into the 
community of democratic states. This led to a hierarchical relationship, were liberal democratic 
norms were considered a goal.
116
 Russia was often treated as a country in the process of 
developing into a democracy, which was dependent on the aid, assistance and guidance of the 
already established democracies.
117
 
 
3.6.  Europeanisation  
 
The end of the Cold War also signified the rise of Europe, along with American power 
hegemony. Realists in IR say that the world established after the Cold War is a unipolar one 
based on American hegemony. Postructuralists reject unipolarity, as there are always processes 
of differentiation due to the referential nature of language. After the Cold War, globalisation 
allowed for the birth of a new system, which was also differential. The new camps were 
developed, peaceful and democratic states and through processes of differentiation, the other 
became the non-developed, conflict-ridden undemocratic states. The new threat was exclusion 
and states were expected to adopt certain “standards of civilisation” to stay close to the core of 
democratic states and not be shunned to the periphery.
118
 The world became increasingly defined 
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by centrality versus periphery as opposed to East versus West. The fear of exclusion and 
periphery also led to an increased number of multilateral engagements and cooperation, seeing as 
non-participation was not an answer anymore,
119
 not even to neutral countries like Sweden. In 
the Nordic region, Norden was seen as less of a possibility and more as the threat of being of 
periphery.
120
 This proves that an existential external threat is not needed for ontological security. 
The threat can take another form, such as fear of exclusion. The fear of exclusion was tightly 
associated with discourses of Europeanisation. 
 
Discourses of Europeanisation became the dominant in the Nordic discourses and big public 
debates and referenda were held regarding EU membership in Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
Finland and Sweden joined Denmark in the EU; meanwhile Norway remained outside the Union. 
The debates regarding Europeanisation, were constructed in such a manner that Nordic 
cooperation was portrayed in opposition to European integration,
121
 Norden represented 
exclusion and isolation. Ontology-seeking strategies were employed in the discourse of 
Europeanisation. The Nordic countries had for a long time seen themselves as “better” and 
Sweden and Finland applied this approach to their EU memberships. Finland did its best to 
become a first-rang EU member states, while Sweden attempted to make EU more Nordic (read 
more Swedish). Meanwhile Denmark took on the role as a teacher from Finland and Sweden
122
. 
Directives were implemented immediately, often with no coordination on the Nordic level. 
 
For Finland the EU membership signified finally shaking off the shackles of the Cold War and 
significant effort was devoted, to prove that Finland belonged there. Through Finland and 
Sweden joining the EU, Denmark lost its Cold War identity as the EU-Nordic link, which also 
lessened the Danish interest in Nordic cooperation. In essence, European integration had 
replaced the USSR as the biggest factor in foreign policy, in particular in Finland and Sweden. 
EU continued to grow in importance with the expansion of the EU. When Finland and Sweden 
joined the EU was still a rather small club of countries. This shift from USSR to EU as focus in 
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foreign policy is evidence of poststructuralist view on IR – the main factor in foreign policy does 
not necessarily have to be an enemy. Nevertheless, the EU did not represent enough difference 
for Nordic cooperation to exist simultaneously, which allowed the Nordic cooperation to lay 
dormant for some time.  
 
3.6.1. The Baltic countries 
 
The independence of the Baltic countries led to significant changes to the Baltic Sea. During the 
Cold War, the Soviet Union had represented half of the Baltic Sea. Now there was a plethora of 
countries. They were slowly integrated into the Nordic sphere and Nordic-Baltic Ministerial 
(NB8) meetings were established. The cooperation is less formalised than the Nordic one, 
however the Baltic countries play a crucial role in the development of the Baltic Sea Region’s 
identity and stability, as well as the Nordic identity and how Russia is portrayed in discourse.  
 
3.7.  The Nordic Phoenix Rises Again  
 
It is difficult to pinpoint a time, when the discourse of renewed Nordic cooperation occurred. 
Well into the 21st century, Nordic cooperation remained out of fashion, as other discourses 
regarding the region were deemed more relevant. Clive Archer, one of the academics concerned 
with Nordic cooperation, wrote in 2009 that there was simply no ethos left to feed the Nordic 
phoenix.
123
 In retrospect, scholars tend to say that it is around 2007–2008 that Nordic 
cooperation re-entered discourse in a positive light. Strang and Olesen, saw it as a turning point 
because of the global financial crisis, led to the return of international attention on the Nordic 
model
124
. The European framework, to which the Nordic EU members had committed 
themselves to, became weaker and failed to live up to its promises when the unemployment rates 
rose in Finland in particular. The countries felt a strong call to safeguard national interests, when 
the EU failed to do so, and hence they turned to each other
125
. The period coincided with a rise in 
immigration, which was also depicted as a challenge. The US and NATO military commitments 
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in Iraq and Afghanistan did not seem to progress as the Taliban executed several successful 
offensives in 2008 in Afghanistan. Furthermore, these global changes coincided with a 
significant increase in Russian military and defence spending. Putin had already for some time 
challenged the established geopolitical security in public speeches, in 2007 calling the unipolar 
system of American hegemony that was established after the Cold War unacceptable.
126
 The 
Russo-Georgian War clearly displayed that Putin’s geopolitical ambitions were more than words. 
This was also strengthened by the symbolic planting of a Russian flag on the North Pole in 
August 2007.
127
 
 
Calls were made for a new kind of Nordic cooperation. In 2009, the Stoltenberg report was 
published, which would come to serve as the basis for future Nordic cooperation within security 
and defence policy.
128
 Other calls for Nordic cooperation were also made. A Swedish historian, 
by the name Gunnar Wetterberg published a work in 2010, called The United Nordic 
Federation,
129
 which gained attention and raised public discussions. He called on a federal union, 
built on the pan-Scandinavian dream. Furthermore, within academia there was a move towards 
more cooperation. In 2012, Johan Strang wrote a report titled Nordic Communities,
130
 which 
called for deeper foreign and defence policies, without a federal union. Wetterberg’s and 
Strang’s works were very different from the Stoltenberg report, in many ways, however they all 
shared a form of scepticism for the established institutions of Nordic cooperation; the Nordic 
Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers.
131
 The institutions were seen as limiting to Nordic 
cooperation, in their consensual nature, with no possibility of opting out. Nordic cooperation has 
always been identifiable through its flexibility, ad hoc character and bottom-up approach.
132
 The 
institutions did not allow for the rise of new Nordic cooperation, but rather worked to maintain 
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the already existent. The assumption was that Nordic cooperation would continue, after the Cold 
War, in areas such as social policy and the promotion of certain norms despite the loss of many 
Cold War identity characteristics.
133
 The rise of cooperation in the policy area of security and 
defence, was however something that few, if any have envisioned.
134
 
 
3.8.  Defence Cooperation  
 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, the former foreign minister of Norway, handed his report to the Nordic 
foreign ministers in February 2009.
135
 The purpose of the report was to evaluate the potential for 
Nordic defence cooperation. The Report contained 13 points where the Nordic countries could 
cooperate within defence. The Stoltenberg Report did not come out of the blue and it did not fill 
a vacuum. Small advances within security cooperation had already been made prior to it. As the 
Cold War ended, there was a normalisation of defence cooperation
136
 as well as a liberalisation 
of it what it entailed. In the 1990’s small advancements included the Nordic Armaments 
Cooperation (NORDAC) and Cooperation Arrangement for Military Peace Support 
(NORDCAPS). There were, however, also failures, such as the Nordic Standard Helicopter 
Project, where the Nordic countries decided, despite joint discussions, to buy helicopters 
separately, from different providers and with different standards. The Stoltenberg Report and the 
establishment of NORDEFCO represented a big step forward in the consolidation of security and 
defence cooperation as part of Nordic cooperation.
137
 
 
The main reasons the Stoltenberg report was commissioned were the decreasing defence 
budgets. Other concerns included the Arctic and Russia
138
. Previously the Norwegian, Swedish 
and Finnish chiefs of defence had made shared calls for increased cooperation, where the main 
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reason was the increasingly small defence budgets. The economic crisis hit hard and the need to 
renew much of the defence equipment was seen as the principal motivator for cooperation. 
Furthermore, the Nordic countries were stretched in terms of their contributions to UN peace 
operation, in for example the Darfur region in Sudan. Through pooling resources, cooperation 
was seen as beneficial.  Additionally, United States had deported from their Keflavik military 
base in 2006, which had led to a number of Russian intrusions into Icelandic airspace. Finally, 
the Arctic was a growing area of concern with the melting of the ice cap, opening up options for 
tourism but also as a source of dispute. Nordic cooperation allowed Finland and Sweden to come 
closer to NATO, without the necessity to have public discussion of potential NATO 
membership. It was however difficult to pinpoint the significance of the Stoltenberg Report and 
it is only in retrospect that it becomes evident. Its value in discourses pertaining to security and 
defence has increased significantly due to the changes in the geopolitical scene that have taken 
place after the Report being published.  
 
The Stoltenberg Report contained 13 points, of which six received immediate attention:  the 
stabilisation task force, air surveillance, satellite system, resource network against cyber-attacks, 
cooperation between foreign services and military cooperation. The 13th point was a mutual 
declaration of solidarity. In 2011, all Nordic countries signed the Nordic Declaration of 
Solidarity. This was considered a controversial suggestion by Stoltenberg, and was put in motion 
by Sweden in 2009, when Sweden stated that it would not stand passive, if a neighbour was 
threatened, or subject to military aggression. The initial goal of the Declaration was something 
similar to NATO’s Article V; however this was deemed too ambitious, and would step on the 
toes of both NATO and the EU. To avoid this, the focus of the Declaration became new 
challenges, such as the climate, terrorism and cyber security. The Declaration was not a one-off; 
a further declaration included the one from the Nordic Defence Ministers meeting in Helsinki 
2013, which confirmed “an enhanced political and military dialogue on security and defence 
issues” which the countries would have by 2020.139 
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The history of Nordic cooperation facilitated the establishment of defence cooperation between 
the Nordic countries. Trust is a characteristic valued highly in the Nordic countries. This 
transnational and informal characteristic of Nordic cooperation allowed Nordic defence 
cooperation to take place also on a more informal level. An example is exchanges between 
military personnel on different levels and good chemistry between ministers of defence. 
Secondly, the discourses about Nordic identity which already existed, allowed for easier defence 
and security cooperation because the “Nordic” label makes it first of all easy as a concept to sell 
to domestic audiences
140
, in particular in Finland and Sweden.
141
 Furthermore, this brand, which 
admittedly is seen as more united from the outside than from the inside,
142
 allows for Nordic 
defence and security cooperation to be taken seriously internationally. 
 
3.9.1. Finnish and Swedish Defence Cooperation with NATO 
 
The cooperation between Finland and Sweden has increased significantly after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The two countries have acted in unison, in particular in their relations to 
NATO. They have progressed from NATO’s Partnership for Peace to Enhanced Opportunities 
and now have a right to attend many NATO meetings. The two countries have been present in 
nearly all NATO missions; Sweden first began its co-operation in NATO’s missions in 
Bosnia.
143
  In their cooperation with each other, they have also facilitated closer cooperation with 
NATO. There seems to be a general consensus that a Swedish or Finnish NATO membership 
would be difficult now, because of the Russia reaction. Russian officials have made it clear to 
both countries that their membership would lead to precautions on the Russian side as well.
144
  
 
3.9. Nordic Security Discourses before Crimea  
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The Russian annexation of Crimea proved to be a turning point for the Western discourses 
regarding Russia and how Russia was seen. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, there are many 
Russian actions which were regarded as antagonistic, in particular the Russo-Georgian War. For 
the Nordic countries, there had been sightings of Russian submarines in the Swedish waters and 
violations of Finnish airspace by the Russian air force. However, the discourses about Russia 
allowed room for cooperation and development in the region – an aspect which was completely 
discarded after 2014. 
 
In the Finnish Government Report on Foreign and Defence Policy of 2012, the importance of 
cooperation with Russia and its commitment to European development is underlined. Russia is 
seen as an important player on the international scene, engaged in the global community to 
promote shared values
145. “Russia keeps promoting a multilateral world order and it wants to be 
duly recognised as a key actor in global policy. Russia underscores the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-interference.”146 is an example of how Russia is portrayed through 
processes of linking as a democratic state with similar values as Finland in the Finnish report 
from 2012. China and Russia are depicted as rivals to each other. Indeed, there is a clear 
desecuritisation of Russia’s military modernisation147 and it is clear that Russian integration into 
the European security order remained one of the Finnish priorities. Furthermore, it is clearly 
underlined: “Finland’s present security environment is stable.”148 
 
In the Swedish report Vägval i en globaliserad värld from 2013, the tone is similar. The tensions 
between China and Russia are referred to as tense.
149
 China is considered the main opponent of 
Western values, such as democracy and human rights.
150
 The relationship between NATO and 
Russia is described as tense, however not antagonistic and based on dialogue.
151
 The biggest 
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threats to European security are considered the frozen conflicts, such as Nagorno-Karabach, 
international crime, epidemics, the relations between Turkey and Cyprus as well as Turkey and 
Russia. EUs enlargement process is seen as a challenge.
152
 Russia is considered a source of 
instability in certain situations in its superpower ambitions, which are based on their nuclear 
arsenal. The situation in the Baltic Sea is described as stable.
153
 
 
The Danish report from the Foreign Minister to the Danish Parliament from 2013 – 2014 
mentioned the many activities that Denmark had engaged in abroad. The biggest concerns were 
the Middle East and Northern Africa. The approach is global and the goal for Danish foreign 
policy is to “take joint responsibility for the management of global challenges to security.”154 
The Russian foreign policy is noted, in particular its confrontational approach towards NATO. 
Denmark’s priorities included supporting NATO’s general secretary in his work to strengthen the 
NATO-Russian cooperation.
155
 The Danish interest is clearly that Russia continues to contribute 
constructively to the global approaches to dealing with regional and global security challenges. 
The global approach of the report means that the regional aspects for example the Baltic Sea 
Region are not addressed at all. The Danish foreign policy had a very global approach and 
Denmark’s own vicinity was not seen as a source of concern or of importance to the extent that it 
is not mentioned at all.  
 
The Norwegian Foreign Minister’s Report to the Norwegian Parliament had a more regional 
approach, when he states that Norway’s foreign policy is based on Norway promoting stability in 
its near vicinity and to promote Norway’s interests abroad.156 The areas of Russo-Norwegian 
cooperation are many and are underlined. These include fisheries, visas and various industries 
and commerce in northern Norway. Certain developments in Russia are seen as worrying, such 
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as the disrespect for certain human rights. Engaging Russia bilaterally and internationally is seen 
as important.
157
 The relationship between USA and China is judged to be the most important 
bilateral relation globally
158
 and the relationship between Norway and China is seen as 
precarious.
159
 The Baltic Sea Region and near vicinity is not mentioned.  
 
Prior to the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea, the discourses relating to Russia within the 
Nordic countries were not particularly antagonistic. There was some apprehension due to the 
domestic developments in Russia, the Russo-Georgian War and the inability to predict the 
direction that Russian foreign policy would take. However, bigger threats were generally the 
situation in the Middle East and Northern Africa with the Arab Spring, as well as Mali. 
Furthermore, China’s growth was seen as a factor that could shift the international balance. 
Nordic cooperation was a factor in each report, except Denmark (which can be attributed to the 
Danish global foreign policy approach). Incentives for deeper Nordic cooperation within security 
policy stemmed from shrinking budgets and the possibility of improved cost efficiency in supply 
of material. The economic benefits of deeper security cooperation are stressed in all reports 
(except Denmark) prior to 2012.
160
 The area where there is the most potential is seen within 
digital security, material, and air surveillance.
161
  
 
3.10. Russia’s Annexation of Crimea 
 
Russia annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in March 2014. At the time Crimea was going 
through a political crisis due to the revolution of February 2014. Kremlin denied the presence of 
Russian troops in Crimea until the middle of April. Only four months after the annexation, in 
July, Prime Minister Medvedev stated that Crimea had been completely integrated into the 
Russian Federation. The majority of the Western world condemned the Russia actions as a 
military intervention and many other stated their support for Ukrainian territorial integrity. 
Sanctions were implemented and are still maintained today.  
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The Russian annexation of Crimea can be understood as the culmination of a number of Russian 
actions; however it proved to be the turning point in the European discourses pertaining to 
Russia. This includes the Nordic discourses. This will be demonstrated in the following chapter, 
which is concerned with the primary data of this Thesis, presented before delving into the 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Data and Results 
 
The following section will present the data. Below is the same summary of the primary data as it 
was presented in the introduction. It is often said regarding the Nordic model, that there is one 
model and five exceptions. Precisely for this reason, this chapter focuses on each report 
separately in a comparative approach. Each subsection will focus on the understanding of 
national security, bilateral relations with Russia, the role of international organisation and 
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multilateral relations. The chapter concludes with a summary of the discourses relating to Russia 
distinguished in the reports.  
Table 2: Summary of the primary data 
Country Name of report Date published Commissioned by/author 
Finland Government report on Finnish 
Foreign and Security Policy 
June 2016 Finnish government /Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
Sweden “Säkerhet i ny tid” – Security in a 
New Era 
August 2016 Swedish government/ 
Ambassador Krister Bringéus 
Norway “Ett felles løft” – A United Effort  April 2015 Minister of Defence Ine 
Eriksen Soreide/ External 
expert group on defence  
Denmark “Dansk diplomati og forsvar i en 
brydningstid” – Danish 
diplomacy and defence in times 
of upheaval 
May 2016 Danish government/ 
Ambassador Peter Taksoe-
Jensen 
 
 
4.1. Primary Data  
 
The data consists of four different government reports, published in Finland, Sweden, Norway 
and Denmark respectively. The exclusion of Iceland is intentional. All primary data has been 
published after 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea. The reports are also the first of their 
sorts in each respective country to be published after the Russian annexation. The role of Russia 
and its actions in Crimea cannot be undermined – the Swedish government has commissioned 
and independent investigation of Swedish international security cooperation with references to 
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the changing security environment.
162
 Norway and Denmark have also commissioned reports. In 
Finland, there is a tradition of publishing a report every four years. The changes in the near 
vicinity and security environment are a strong justification for publishing of these reports. This 
can be seen already in the titles, which refer to change and a need to act in unison. In the Danish 
report itself, brydningstid is defined as “a time of worry and transitions”. Similarly, the “new 
era” in the Swedish Report is defined by an “unpredictable character that has crept into the 
Sweden security environment.”163 
 
The timeframe poses a challenge to the research enquiry since it is a highly relevant to current 
affairs, and recent developments affect how security is understood for these four countries. To 
limit the timeframe, I have chosen the years 2014–2016 to avoid taking into consideration any 
further implications that current affairs can have had on the perceptions and representations of 
Nordic identity. 
 
There are multiple reasons for excluding Iceland from my primary data. First of all, Iceland has 
released no report equivalent to the other Nordic countries. Iceland released its first ever 
National Security Policy in 2016.
164
 However, the policy document lacks depth and is only two 
pages long. It remains noteworthy that Iceland indeed has released this document after the 
annexation of Crimea. Iceland has never had a standing army and has hence not had a national 
security policy either. Iceland, a founding member of NATO, joined NATO on the premise that 
it would never be asked to establish one. The lack of standing army has in the past created 
different security concerns for Iceland, which represents the second reason. Finally, Iceland 
remains geographically distant from the increasingly securitised Baltic Sea Region, which also 
means it has less interest in the geopolitically tense relations there. Within security studies on the 
Nordic region scholars tend to focus on the four largest ones.
165
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4.1.1. Finland  
 
The Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy was published in September 
2016, by the Prime Minister’s Office. As previously mentioned, there is a tradition in Finland to 
publish similar reports every four years. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland is in charge 
of writing it. The purpose is to shape Finnish foreign and security policy until 2020. In media the 
report lost limelight because of Brexit, which happened only a week later. The report’s 
irrelevance, because of its timing – it does not include Brexit or the election of Trump, is covered 
in Finnish media
166
. The report states that the main objective of the Finnish foreign and security 
policy is “to avoid becoming a party to a military conflict”167 and that “The goal of Finland’s 
foreign and security policy is to strengthen Finland’s international position, to secure 
independence and territorial integrity, to improve the security and wellbeing of Finns and to 
ensure that the society functions efficiently”168. The balance between the traditional views on 
security; independence and territorial integrity, and more contemporary notions of security that 
includes society and the wellbeing of citizens, is clearly visible. Finland has one of the most 
traditional notions of security compared to its fellow Nordic countries. This is reflected in its 
discourses about Russia. The relations between Finland and Russia have, out of the Nordic 
countries, been the most complex.  
 
Finnish relations to Russia must a large extent shape the Finnish foreign policy towards Russia. 
Finland remained a part of Sweden until 1809 when the territory of Finland was lost to Russia. 
Finland gained its independence from Russia in 1917. During the era when Finland was a Grand 
Duchy of Russia, Finland experienced rather severe oppression of Finnish separatism, which was 
called Russification.
169
 Finland’s security policy was based on the League of Nations and it was 
only when its failures became clear that the Finnish Parliament voted for a Scandinavian security 
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policy in 1935.
170
 Finland engaged during World War II in two wars with the Soviet Union, but 
succeeded in staying independent. The Cold War period was informative in shaping the relations 
towards Russia seen in the Government Report. Finland managed to stay outside the Warsaw 
Pact, however the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed 
between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine was applied to Finnish 
foreign policy throughout the length of the Cold War. Good relations with Russia were a 
precondition for Finnish survival, with the simultaneous advocacy of Finnish neutrality. During 
the Cold War, the Finns went to great lengths to maintain these relations, which can be seen 
through the Notecrisis in 1961 and Urho Kekkonen’s long presidency. However military 
preparedness was maintained at all times. Russia was the epitome of existential threat to Finland. 
When the Soviet Union dissolved, the YYA Agreement from 1948 was replaced with agreements 
on trade and cooperation in a number of fields
171
.  
 
In the Government Report, the importance of bilateral relations between Finland and Russia are 
underlined. Out of the four reports, the Finnish one is the sole to include a separate section on the 
“importance of relations with Russia”. It is also the only report to support direct contact between 
citizens and support for the civil society. Finland maintains some of the discourse from before 
Crimea in promoting cooperation and dialogue
172
 and the purpose of Finnish policy remains to 
maintain “stable and well-functioning relations”173. There is a visible prudency in the Report’s 
approach to Russia, however the threat that Russia poses is not ignored.  
 
The report refrains from painting an extensive enemy image of Russia, yet it is clear that Russia 
presents a threat to Finland. The report employs a more moderate, indirect form of existential 
othering. The report states early on that “The use of threat or military force against Finland 
cannot be excluded”174 due to the increasingly tense security environment, but Russia is not 
mentioned. However, in other parts of the report, Russia’s return to power politics is described as 
the source of new insecurity in Finland’s vicinity. This is one of many examples, where the 
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Report avoids referring directly to Russia, and rather denotes “tense security situation”175 or 
“unpredictability in the security policy environment”176. This kind of indirect othering echoes 
Finnish foreign policy from the Cold War.  
 
The focus on national security in the Finnish report is the most distinctive of all four reports. 
This in itself is also a flashback to Cold War discourses. While the other reports see a Russian 
invasion of the Baltics as a threat with catastrophical consequences
177
, the Finnish report places 
very little focus on the Baltic States’ security. The Report states that “The security and prosperity 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are important to Finland”178. In doing so, the Report chooses to 
prioritise Finnish national security, and the othering remains indirect.  
 
A significant difference is that the Finnish neutrality, which was a cornerstone of Finnish Cold 
War policy, is no more. The report portrays a Finland that is defined by its multilateral relations 
and its membership in international organisations. The Finnish identity is deeply embedded in 
the Western value community through its EU membership, which in turn allows for more radical 
othering of Russia. In stating that; “The EU’s common positions on Russia form the basis for 
Finland’s actions”179, Finland can also create distance from Russia, without risking direct 
deterioration of bilateral relations. Russia is portrayed as a threat to the European security 
community: “Russia has mostly abandoned the cooperation-based security thinking. Rather, now 
it challenges the European security system”180. Russia is depicted as having a different 
understanding of international relations, of challenging the established order and bringing 
uncertainty to the entire region, but also Europe. The securitisation is more direct, when the 
discourse is concerned with the European security and value community than with the Finnish 
national security. The Russian employment of hybrid warfare and methods is seen as a threat to 
the rules-based international order, because the hybrid methods cause instability. This is 
juxtaposed against the Western democracies, which represent stability.  
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The relations between Finland and the USA, as well as Finland and NATO, are seen as important 
to Finnish foreign policy, and there is a call for deeper cooperation on both fronts. Russia is 
depicted as polar to both the US and NATO. NATO, when it comes to security is seen as central 
to the Western value and security community, even though Finland is not a member of NATO. 
While Russia is seen as the source of insecurity in the region (as mentioned above), “The 
presence and action of NATO brings security to the region”181. Furthermore, NATO’s presence 
in Europe is seen as integral to the Finnish national defence
182
. Finland has clearly departed from 
its Cold War neutrality policy, but also its policy of non-alignment can be questioned through 
these statements.  
  
The most poignant discourses regarding the Russia in the Finnish Government Report can be 
distinguished through how the Report defines the Finnish identity and self. When the self is 
understood as Finnish national identity, the discourses of differentiation are significantly less 
radical than when the Finnish national identity is denoted through its EU membership and 
belonging to the Western value and security community. Russia is an existential threat to Finland 
in the sense that it is indirectly stated that a military threat from Russia cannot be excluded. 
However, the indirect differentiation allows for the simultaneous existence of bilateral relations 
based on dialogue.
183
  
 
4.1.2. Sweden   
 
The Swedish Report “Security in a New Era” (Säkerhet i ny tid) was published in September 
2016. Krister Bringéus was in charge of writing the report. Bringéus is a Swedish diplomat who 
has been posted in Moscow, Washington D.C., a number of European countries as well as 
OSCE. The report was covered in a number of daily newspapers and seen as controversial by 
some.
184
 The report is broad and covers a number of formats of Swedish international 
cooperation in the foreign and security policy spheres ranging from membership in international 
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organisations to bilateral relations. The Swedish understanding of national security is 
significantly broader than the traditional territorial interpretations of national security. The three 
goals of Swedish security policy are to defend the people’s lives and wellbeing, to defend the 
functioning of society and to defend Swedish values such as democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law
185
. Hence, the joint priority of the Swedish foreign, security and defence policies, is 
“to secure the value which constitute the Swedish society, the belief in democracy and the equal 
value of all people”186. Essentially elements that pose a threat to these said values also threaten 
Swedish security. 
 
The Swedish neutrality and the military nonalignment is integrated deep into the Swedish 
identity to the extent that the authors of the Swedish Government, when they commissioned the 
report, specifically asked for the exclusion of Sweden’s military nonalignment policy from the 
Report. Sweden has not engaged in a war since 1814. The Swedish foreign policy’s cornerstone 
has been one of non-alignment during peacetime and neutrality during wartime
187
. It was tested 
several times, for example during the dispute with Finland over the Åland Islands in 1921 and 
during World War II. Sweden did not engage with armed forces during WWII, but did give 
material support to Finland during the Winter War.
188
 Sweden did accept assistance through the 
Marshall Aid Plan, but did not join NATO. The relations between Russia and Sweden were 
formal. They became tense after an incident when a Russian submarine emerged in Swedish 
waters in the 1980’s, and the Swedish defence forces were mobilised. Sweden maintained large 
armed forces, as a guarantee for its neutrality policy. In the 1960’s Sweden still pursued an 
independent nuclear weapon programme. By 1960, the US provided a military security guarantee 
to Sweden. This was kept from the public until 1994.
189
 With the end of the Cold War, Sweden 
commenced a significant reduction of its armed forces. By joining the EU, Sweden also resigned 
from its policy of neutrality and adopted one of non-alignment. In doing so, the values and norms 
gained significant leverage in Swedish foreign policy.  
                                                     
185
 Bringéus, 2016: 32 
186
 Bringéus, 2016:33 
187
 Swedish Institute (2016) Fact sheet: History of Sweden Swedish Institute 
https://sweden.se/society/history-of-sweden/ (accessed 2.3.2017)  
188
 Vinterkriget Uppslagsverket Finland http://uppslagsverket.fi/sv/view-103684-Vinterkriget (accessed 
24.2.2017) 
189
 Bruzelius, Nils (2008): Unilaterally if necessary: One motive behind the American security guarantee 
to Sweden Särtryck ur Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet Nr:1 2008, Växjö pp: 50-66: 50 
49 
 
 
 
 
The Swedish report clearly states, that an isolated attack on Sweden can be excluded. Russia 
remains the only country in Sweden’s near vicinity “who could within a certain time make use of 
military aggression against its neighbours,”190 However, even that is unlikely. Despite the lack of 
direct threat, Russia is in discourse differentiated radically and portrayed as a threat. The Report 
manages to portray Russia as a threat since it threatens the norms and values that constitute the 
base of the Swedish national identity.  
 
The report acknowledges the impact of Russian aggression in Sweden’s near vicinity. First of all, 
it is acknowledged that if there were a conflict or some form of escalation, Sweden would be 
drawn into it an early stage. The fact that NATO would ask for permission to use Swedish 
territory at in an early stage is acknowledged in the report.
191
 The security of the Baltic States 
remains of vital importance since; “Sweden would not alone be able to organise the reception of 
the flows of refugees, which a military attack would lead to.”192 This reflects the Swedish broad 
and cross-sector understanding of security. In terms of the impact Russian action could have on 
the Swedish understanding of security, Russia already poses a significant threat. There is no 
reference to bilateral relations between Russia and Sweden, nor the promotion of a relations 
based on dialogue or cooperation.  
 
The importance of values like democracy and rule of law for the Swedish understanding of 
security means that membership in international organisations that promote these values is 
crucial. Sweden places a significant amount of weight on the UN, because of its promotion of 
human rights and cooperation-based international relations. Indeed, membership in the UN is 
covered prior membership in the EU or the OSCE, in the report.
193
 The importance of various 
memberships becomes particularly visible when the authors of the report claim that, for the 
Baltic states, more than NATO membership being a security guarantee, it is “the inclusion in 
NATO – and the European integration – have an existential psychological value for the societies 
of the Baltic people...it is ultimately about the social cohesion and endurance, about the faith in 
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oneself”194. The defence minister of .e.g. Latvia would hardly claim that NATO is about faith in 
oneself, but about Article V of NATO.  
 
Russian actions in Crimea are seen as the greatest threat to the European security order, which 
was established after the Cold War
195
. Russia is depicted through radical forms of differentiation, 
in many cases portrayed as the alter to the Swedish ego. References to Cold War identities are 
made in the Report, such as the Russian “return” to power politics and the Russian interest in 
building spheres of influence and buffer zones
196
. The Baltic Sea is depicted as the new point of 
friction between the West and Russia, just like Eastern Europe was during the Cold War
197
. The 
blame is completely on Russia, who has “chosen to develop an antagonistic relationship to the 
West”198. Russia’s employment of hybrid warfare methods is seen as one of the largest and most 
significant threats to Western democracies. Western democracies are seen as synonymous with 
stability, while hybrid warfare methods specifically seek to destabilise the functioning of society, 
through non-linear methods, with no clear defining line between war and peace. 
199
 It allows for 
radical differentiation of states employing such methods, of which Russia is the principal one. 
 
The Russian non-adherence to the norms that the Report sets out creates hierarchical discourses, 
where the Western democracies are defined as superior to the Russian ones. The Russian 
political system is described as “fundamentally flawed”200. Furthermore, “democracy and social 
market economy represent through their inherent attractiveness… a threat to the current Russian 
political system.”201 Constructing a Russia that is inferior through the non-respect for values, 
constructed by the West, create an uneven relationship.  
 
In the Swedish Report, Russia is portrayed as the greatest threat to European security and the 
established cooperation-based world order. The focus on values and norms can also be justified 
by the awareness that Sweden is incapable of defending itself from foreign military aggression 
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and is reliant on other countries aid.
202
  Cold War discourses are employed to portray Russia as 
the radical other, contrasted against Europe, through different values, norms, perspectives and 
domestic policies. Sweden, has historically not had close ties with Russia, and has not had a need 
for such; hence such discourses are not employed. Ironically, maybe the Report calls for the 
promotion of a cooperation-based regime, however not for cooperation specifically with Russia.  
 
4.1.3. Norway  
 
Norway’s report “Ett felles löft” (A Unified Effort), published 28 April 2015, is the first time 
that an independent expert group has been appointed to analyse and produce a report on the 
Norwegian defence’s options and capabilities in solving its most demanding challenges.203 The 
expert group consisted of seven individuals from academia, the armed forces and foreign policy 
representatives. The expert group also had a secretariat of six people. The media and experts 
received the report in a positive manner.
204
 The report is concerned with security and defence 
and the Norwegian Armed Forces. National security is defined as “preserving the existence, 
sovereignty, sovereign rights and integrity…[it] may be challenged through armed attack, 
political and military pressure, and serious strikes against Norwegian interests by state and non-
state actors”205. However, the notion of security is not limited to that; societal security, which 
includes the “preservation of the lives, health and safety of the population” as well as other 
functions such as infrastructure in the society,
206
 is also brought up. The link between the two is 
clearly illustrated in an image in the Report,
207
 which shows that when national security is 
threatened, societal security is challenged as well.  
 
                                                     
202
 Bringéus, 2016: 54  
203
 Et felles løft - Ekspertgruppen for forsvaret av Norge regjering.no: webiste summary 
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/et-felles-loft---fra-ekspergruppen-for-forsvaret-av-
norge/id2427726/ (accessed 25.1.2017) 
204
 Hansen Bundt, Kate Et felles løft Den Norske Atlanterhavskomité – The Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee: weekly analysis http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/post/325638/et-felles-loft (accessed 
22.2.2017) 
205
 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy (2015): Et felles loft- Ekspertgruppen 
for forsvaret av Norge.  Ministry of Defence 05/2015, Department for security and service organisation, 
Oslo:7 
206
  Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 8 
207
   Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 9 
52 
 
 
 
Norway’s relations with Russia have been shaped by its border, which was defined in 1826, and 
the conditions in the far North where oil plays a central role. Norway joined NATO as a 
founding member after World War Two and hence the border became one of two land borders 
between NATO and the USSR.
208
 The Soviet Union was portrayed in Norway as Norway’s 
principal enemy and the border always had a heavy Norwegian military presence. However, 
Norway implemented a self-imposed restraint on the amount of NATO activity in the Northern 
Finnmark region and a number of other restrictions,
209
 for the purpose of not being portrayed in 
Russian eyes as too aggressive. Simultaneously, very successful bilateral relations emerged 
through the mutual restraints imposed. One of the successes was the 1975 Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Fishing Industry. It included fishing quotas, coastal state jurisdiction and 
importantly, it allowed access of Russian vessels in Norwegian Economic Exclusive Zones 
(EEZ) and vice versa.
210
 During the Cold War this was known as the Norwegian dual policy 
towards the Soviet Union.
211
 When the Soviet Union dissolved, an era of deeper cooperation 
ensued, mainly through common interests such as the Barents Sea, the Arctic and the 
environment. 
 
For Norway, “the relations to Russia are the most important single factor in Norwegian defence 
planning.”212 The references to the border between Norway and Russia are numerous and Russia 
is portrayed as a very serious threat to Norwegian national security. The report depicts three 
possible scenarios where Norwegian national security; an escalation of a bilateral crisis (most 
probably in the North), collective defence in the Baltic countries and a terrorist attack. The two 
former ones include Russia as the main perpetrator. The language is one of securitisation; 
“probability of a military invasion seems small today, one cannot ignore such a risk in the long-
term.”213 
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However, on a national level the report also calls for a dual policy towards Russia, similar to that 
during the Cold War. The goal of the dual policy is to maintain functioning bilateral relations 
with Russia, in particular in policies relating to the Arctic. Shared interests constitute the basis 
for this form of cooperation. A reason for this approach is also what is called an “asymmetrical 
neighbourhood”214, where Norway is recognised as a small country with a big neighbour. This is 
present and repeated multiple times in the report. This awareness of size provides Norway with 
incentives to draw on the transatlantic identity.  
 
Proactive NATO membership is in a key position in the report, because NATO’s collective 
defence also signifies Norway’s ultimate security guarantee. Hence relations with the USA are 
also deemed vital, which is called an “alliance within an Alliance.”215 The awareness that the 
geopolitical situation combined with NATO membership poses a threat is also clear in the 
Report; “an attack on Norway would not be limited to a fight against Norway, but a fight over 
Norway”216. NATO membership is completely integrated in the Norwegian national identity.  
The report makes it clear that that Norway and NATO are inseparable. In this report, references 
to other international organisations are few and far between. NATO is the symbol for the 
Western security community. Norway’s non-membership in the EU also explains the focus 
placed on the Western security community and the lack of reference to a European security 
community. The focus on the Western identity leads to a strong differentiation between Russia 
and the West. “Norway is part of the Western security community” while “Russia stands on the 
outside of the Western security community.”217 Overall, emotive language is used; through the 
annexation of Crimea Russia has broken the “deep peace”218, which reigned in Europe. The term 
“West” is used 92 times (89 in juxtaposition to Russia) in the Norwegian Report. In comparison, 
the word “West” is only used four times in the Finnish one. Russia is portrayed in stark 
opposition to the West, as something that the West is not. Russia is constructed as the 
constitutive other of the West, rather than a geographical area.  
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The hybrid warfare methods used by Russia are also used to construct an enemy image, but also 
to create an image of inferiority. Western superiority is described through technological 
developments, however in adopting hybrid warfare methods; Russia, China and a number of 
other countries have “implemented measures which have compensated for Western conventional 
dominance.”219 Within the sphere of hybrid trends, the West remains inferior and vulnerable, 
according to the Report.
220
 Hybrid warfare is tied strongly to the enemy image of Russia and its 
antagonistic views on the West. Hybrid tools are pitted against NATO. One of the main 
conclusions of the report is the need for a “unified effort” with multiple societal actors, to be 
capable to act simultaneously and seamlessly,
221
 in response to new threats such as the hybrid 
ones.  
 
The Norwegian Report depicts an enemy image of Russia, both in the Arctic and in the Baltic 
Sea, as well as on a global level. The Russian dual policy however, simultaneously allows for 
cooperation in certain spheres of shared interest. The enemy image does not exclude cooperation 
in other areas. This allows for Russia to have multiple identities, depending on the region or level 
in question.  
 
4.1.4.  Denmark  
 
The Danish report Dansk diplomati og forsvar i brydningstid (Danish diplomacy and defence in 
times of change) is an investigation of Danish foreign and security policy, published in May 
2016 it has a broad approach to how Danish interests should be pursued up to 2030.  The report 
was written by Peter Taksøe-Jensen, who was at the time the Danish Ambassador to India. He 
has previously been the Ambassador to the USA as well as the Assistant Secretary-General of 
Legal Affairs at the UN. The report was covered in the media quite neutrally.
222
The purpose of 
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Denmark’s foreign policy is to “understand, influence and adjust to international developments 
with the primary aim of maintaining and continuously shaping a safe, free and prosperous 
Denmark, based on a set of values to benefit its people” 223. In the report, foreign policy is 
understood as the ensemble of defence, security, development and trade policy. Denmark has in 
essence discarded traditional security, such as territorial integrity. Rather, Danish security 
encompasses all Danish interests, and Danish security policy consists of “contributions to 
international operations, through which Denmark can impact the international environment...and 
promote Danish interests.”224 
 
Diplomatic relations between Russia and Denmark were established relatively late; in 1924, 
when Denmark recognised the Soviet Union. Denmark attempted to stay neutral in both World 
Wars, without avail. Through its occupation by Nazi Germany, Denmark had little choice but to 
join the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1941, however insisting on its neutrality towards Russia. As a 
country in the middle of Europe when Europe was divided in the middle, Denmark attempted to 
keep a relatively neutral stance. Like Norway, the other Nordic founding NATO member, 
Denmark attempted to restrict NATO, to keep the area low tension. This was also in the Soviet’s 
interest. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, more cooperation ensued, in particular in the 
Arctic and the Baltic Sea. Cooperation with the US became of utmost importance because of the 
fear that the USA would forget Denmark/Europe without the Soviet Union threat. As a 
consequence Denmark (and Norway) adopted pro-American policies. Being anti-American, for 
example during the Iraq War, could come at a high strategic cost. The Danish geopolitical 
significance decreased as Denmark found itself in the middle of Europe after EU and NATO 
enlargements.  
 
Denmark has since the collapse of the Soviet Union, renounced itself of traditional security 
concerns and the armed forces were decreased significantly. Through the expansion of the 
European Union and NATO, Denmark has ceased to be a “be a frontline state” in relation to the 
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East
225
. In the Report, there are no references to changes in Denmark’s near vicinity, rather the 
changes are seen as European or global. Correspondingly, the report judges that “an increased 
military threat to Danish territory is still not likely.”226 Denmark is the only Nordic country, 
which has not increased its military expenditure to due to the situation in the Baltic Sea.
227
 
Furthermore, the report evaluates that the choice to eliminate full conscription remains justified 
(unlike the Swedish Report). Denmark sees the threat that Russia poses as level to that of 
uncontrolled migration and climate change.  
 
The European Union is important because of the value community it is. Seeing as Denmark has 
opted out of the EU Common Security and Defence Cooperation, Denmark also has no say in its 
developments, and hence places even greater worth on the EU as an advocator of norms and 
values. Denmark still gives its support; “Denmark should, in relation to Russia, support EU’s 
joint, robust and principled policy outward and its policy of unity and endurance inwards.”228 
When it comes to national defence, Denmark lays all its faith in NATO, and Denmark’s goal 
becomes ensuring the credibility of NATO’s deterrence capacity.229 
 
Western democratic values are strongly linked with stability in the Report. “Denmark is a 
country that thrives in a regular and predictable international order.”230 This is due to the 
characteristics that Denmark as a country possesses: democratic, open and abiding to the rule of 
law. Predictability in turn is provided by NATO’s deterrence credibility. These form the 
premises for Danish security policy: stability through democracy and Western values and 
predictability through NATO deterrence. In the report, Russia presents a threat to the democratic 
values and, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, there are discussions about NATO’s 
collective defence. Hybrid methods in particular are seen as a source of instability and a threat to 
predictability, since they are inherently made to destabilise the target society from a variety of 
directions simultaneously.  
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Denmark has a very global approach to security. Rather than adopting Cold War dichotomies, 
the Report advocates for a multipolar world: “Despite the Russian regime challenging Western 
values, it does not represent a global ideological confrontation”231. Rather than pitting Russia 
against NATO or the West, the Report argues that in a multipolar world Russian inferiority is 
demonstrated: “The global balance of power is today more expanded… globally, Russia is far 
from matching USA’s the EU’s military and economic power”232. This is a more moderate 
approach to Russia, than direct securitisation. However, it does provide Russia with an inferior 
identity.  
 
The Report does not do much to promote good bilateral relations between Denmark and Russia.  
The argument used many times is that the general international trust in Russia has been reduced 
significantly, which hinders cooperation
233
, particularly in the Arctic. Seeing as trust is defined 
as key component to Danish society and values, this is more notable othering.  
 
The discourse allows for securitisation and more radical forms of othering, through values and 
NATO membership, which are fundamental to Danish identity. The Russian use of hybrid 
warfare in Ukraine allows for the construction of a enemy image of Russia; juxtaposed with 
Western, open democracies. However, NATO-Russia dichotomies are avoided, and rather 
discourses of multipolar worlds are evoked. The multipolar world order constructs hierarchical 
identities, which are further maintained by emphasis on values, which Russia does not meet.  
 
4.2. Results 
 
Based on the application of the poststructuralist discourse analysis and the identification of 
different discourses in the primary data, it is clear that there are very differing views on Russia 
on the national level. The following figure summarises these differences. 
 
Figure 3: Results of the primary data  
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This figure is based on qualitative methods. Drawing on the figure above, the following 
conclusions can be made regarding perceptions of national security and othering of Russia:  
 
1) All Nordic countries engage in active othering and differentiation of Russia, however to 
different extents. 
2) Neither EU nor NATO membership have a decisive effect on the respective national 
discourses and level of othering of Russia.  
3) A border with Russia coincides with a more traditional understanding of security (Finland 
and Norway).  
4) A more traditional understanding of security (focus on territorial integrity) converges 
with the promotion of cooperation with Russia. 
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5) Differentiation and securitisation are not the same thing. Finland and Norway engage in 
securitisation but significantly less differentiation.  
6) The broader the definition of security and understanding of self (including values and 
norms, usually through international organisations) the broader the enemy image of 
Russia is constructed.  
7) Values can be overlooked for cooperation when the security only encompasses national 
territorial security. 
 
4.3. Discourses in Data 
 
Based on the poststructuralist discourse analysis of the primary data, six discourses about Russia 
can be distinguished. The three first ones engage in more radical differentiation and 
securitisation of Russia, while two are less radical. The final discourse is the least radical, where 
cooperation is promoted in certain areas.  
 
Russia is securitised through statements that Russia is a direct threat; the language is easily 
distinguished, through language that depicts an enemy. This strongest form of securitisation 
occurs on the national level (in the Norwegian and Finnish reports) and on a regional or global 
scale in the Swedish and Danish reports. It is slightly less radical when the securitisation is done 
indirectly through referring to new threats in the security environment. This is most common in 
the Finnish report. Another manner, in which Russia is radically othered, is in the return of Cold 
War discourses. When discourses are about bipolarity, balance of power and spheres of 
influence, it portrays a very radical othering of Russia, simply because the Cold War represented 
in many ways the ultimate othering of Russia/Soviet Union.  
 
Norms and values are a manner in which to differentiate in a less radical manner. Certain norms 
and values are depicted as “universal”, and central to the Western value community. To be part 
of the community, a country has to adhere to the norms. It creates a hierarchical relation, which 
is often constructed through choice of diction, for example the use of the word “promote”. 
Promote suggests that one country is always in the receiving end which creates a hierarchical 
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relationship, for example through the promotion of democracy or cooperation.
234
 In general, the 
domestic developments in Russia are described in a negative and reprehensive tone.
235
 
 
Hybrid warfare and methods is a common theme in all reports. It is used to portray difference to 
Russia in all reports. Hybrid warfare is considered in opposition to democratic open states, and is 
portrayed as a threat to the Western states. Discourses on hybrid methods work to differentiate 
Russia and construct the idea that Western states are stable while hybrid warfare is tied to 
instability.  
 
The final discourse recognised is one that entails the least amount of differentiation. Rather than 
stressing the differences similarities are underlined to facilitate cooperation in certain areas, such 
as the Arctic, economic cooperation or other shared interests.
236
 Finland and Norway promote 
the most bilateral cooperation with Russia. Another way of diminishing the differences is 
portraying Russia as a rational actor. In the traditional (dominant) understanding of IR, states are 
described as rational. This is done through explaining why Russia might be acting in a certain 
manner; such explanation to why NATO’s advancements are seen as a threat by Russia (lack of 
consideration for Russian interests),
237
 rather than simply portraying Russian actions as 
antagonistic. The absence of rational actor characteristics allows for more radical othering.  
 
 
 
 
5. Discussion: Nordic Identity 
 
The previous chapter has provided an overview of each state´s respective take on Russia and the 
main discourses identified in the primary data. The discussion will build on these discourses and 
focus on the role of values, incentives for Nordic cooperation as well as the role of international 
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organisations such as NATO. For this purpose, repeating the research question may be useful:  
 
How does the othering of Russia in Nordic security discourses contribute to the social 
construction of Nordic identity after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014?  
 
5.1. Norden in the Primary Data  
   
Nordic cooperation and references to Nordic values are present in all four reports. The manner in 
which Norden is present in each report reflects their understanding of security overall. For 
Denmark, Norden is first and foremost a value community, which is seen as the vantage point for 
the Danish identity, along with the European identity and the Danish bilateral relations to the 
USA.
238
 As a NATO country, Nordic defence cooperation remains low on the list of priorities. 
Sweden highlights the value community, the complementary character of Nordic defence 
cooperation and the importance of cooperation with Finland. Norway has little focus on Nordic 
cooperation, because of its focus on defence and sees the Finnish and Swedish decision to stay 
outside of NATO as an obstacle to further cooperation. The Finnish report underlines the value 
community and its importance to Finnish security. The structure of the discussion will be as 
following: first of all a section on values, secondly on defence cooperation and Russia’s 
influence on it, a critique of the Nordic defence cooperation and a section on where the Nordic 
identity places itself globally.  
 
5.2.  Norden as a Value Community 
 
In the primary data, Nordic cooperation and the Nordic countries is first and foremost understood 
as a value community. However, the manner in which it is expressed in the primary data varies 
greatly; the Swedish and Danish reports are more “Norden-friendly”, in particular when it comes 
to highlighting the value community that Norden represents. For Denmark, Norden is seen as 
natural: “Denmark shares a natural interest and value community in particular with the other 
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Nordic countries”239. The Swedish report is also rather vocal in the role of Norden as a value 
community, where there is an “inherited Nordic feeling of belonging and of a value 
community”240. Meanwhile, the Norwegian and Finnish reports focus less on the Norden as a 
value community. This can be explained by their more national discourses – as opposed to 
international. While the Finnish report expresses the importance of Nordic cooperation, it claims 
that “Finland and Sweden, sharing a value basis and the same security environment”241. Due to 
the Norwegian report, being a report on defence policy, there are significantly fewer references 
to value communities overall.  
 
The Nordic values and their value communities also allow, through processes of linking, 
becoming closer to NATO and the EU. The Nordic countries security guarantees have previously 
been seen as the principal obstacle to deeper Nordic defence and security cooperation. However, 
now the different security choices play a smaller role and values are underlined. Norway depicts 
the relationship between NATO and Sweden and Finland as a “semi alliance”242 in the sense that 
it is a functional defence community; however the guarantee of Article 5 is missing. Indeed, for 
Denmark and Norway, the Finnish and Swedish adhesion to NATO would bring increased 
security to the region
243
. One of the most poignant processes of linking is the ease at which a 
Finnish and Swedish adhesion would supposedly take place
244
, indeed no strong obstacle to 
Finnish and Swedish membership exists. Even Finland and Sweden, the non-members, make use 
of discourses where NATO is strongly contrasted against Russia, as it is seen as a source of 
stability to the region
245
. The fact that two of the Nordic countries are not NATO members was 
previously seen as an ultimate obstacle and difference between the Nordic countries. This is now 
disregarded and it allows for values to be the vessel that pushes Nordic cooperation into the 
security sphere. Despite values being the basis for this process of linking, it serves purpose 
within the security dimension as well.   
 
                                                     
239
 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 32 
240
 Swedish government, 2016: 61  
241
 Finnish government, 2016: 12 
242
 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 43 
243
 Taksøe-Jensen, 2016: 29 
244
 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015: 44 
245
 Finnish government, 2016: 12 
63 
 
 
 
As opposed to the Cold War identities of neutrality, low-tension and peaceful, there are clear 
statements of “which side” the Nordic countries take. In the Norwegian and Danish reports, there 
is very clear support for Finnish and Swedish NATO membership. This is remarkable as a shift 
away from all that is Nordic Balance and “keeping respective superpowers out”.  NATO 
constantly portrayed as the radical other to Russia, and in taking the Western side, there is a clear 
bandwagoning with NATO by the Nordic countries as an entity. Simultaneously, in doing so the 
Nordic countries contribute to the polarisation, between the USA and Russia as well as 
increasing the importance of the Baltic Sea Region.  
 
5.3.  From Global to Regional: the Baltic Sea’s Growing Importance 
 
During the Cold War, the Nordic countries were defenders of sovereignty, speaking up for 
countries far beyond the Nordic sphere of interest. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Nordic countries horizons broadened. At the same time, military conscription in Denmark and 
Sweden was completely abolished and military and defence spending decreased significantly. 
The Nordic countries were active players in the era of humanitarian interventions. Along with 
discourses of Europeanisation, the outlook for the Nordic countries was increasingly global at 
that time, which also reflected the Nordic cooperation. The Nordic countries acted together in 
international peacekeeping missions. An example of this is the Nordic Battle Group, an EU 
battle group. With increasingly antagonistic Russian actions, culminating in Crimea in 2014, the 
focus of the Nordic countries changed, from a global one to a regional one. Europe ceased to be 
the main factor in the countries’ foreign policy and Russia took centre stage.  
 
The Baltic Sea Region emerged in discourse as increasingly securitised. The increasing Russian 
military presence in Kaliningrad and along the borders to the Baltic States, Russian aircraft in 
Finnish and Norwegian airspace and Russian submarines in Swedish waters have all contributed 
to the securitisation of the region. In the primary data, it is in particular in discourses about 
Russia that the Baltic Sea Region is described as a region of instability and increasingly tense 
relations. This signifies a clear shift from the identity of the region, only 10 years prior to the 
illegal annexation of Crimea. The Baltic Sea Region, along with the Arctic, was considered 
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regions for deeper cooperation, which involved Russia
246
. Discourses of shared heritage or a 
revival of the Hanseatic Sea Basin have since been discarded. Indeed, the Nordic countries have 
been thrown into the spotlight after over a century of being seen as the “quiet corner of 
Europe.”247 This fundamental shift in identity of the Baltic Sea Region, due to Russian action, 
represents a change in the Nordic cooperation as well. Nordic cooperation has lost, to a great 
extent its global dimension. The Swedish Report states it clearly: “The challenges of the Baltic 
Sea Region have come to replace the peacekeeping mission as the common [Nordic] purpose.”248 
Nordic cooperation, in particular within defence and security has shifted its focus from the global 
to the regional, which in turn allows for development of Nordic cooperation in areas where it has 
previously not taken place, such as security and defence.  
 
5.4. Nordic Cooperation as a Stabilising Factor in the Baltic Sea Region 
 
Nordic cooperation has adopted a stabilising identity in an increasingly unstable Baltic Sea 
Region. Russia is without exception described as the destabilising force in the region. Nordic 
cooperation is depicted in discourse as a counterweight to the Russian instability in the region. In 
the Swedish report, Nordic cooperation is seen as a source of regional security
249
, while the 
Finnish report states that “Nordic cooperation as… central importance to Finland and its 
security”250. Furthermore, the Danish report seen the Nordic defence cooperation in the light the 
“heightened tensions in the security policy environment around the Baltic Sea Region”251, while 
Norway sees the cooperation as important for joint action in emergency preparedness in crises of 
the highest level.”252 Russia as a source of instability provides the Nordic foreign policy 
dialogues the opportunity to depict themselves as the source of stability. The juxtaposition allows 
the Nordic countries to be portrayed as stable in contrast to Russia, and as a stabilising force in 
contrast to the unstable region.  
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5.5. Russia Replaces Economic Benefits as Key Incentive  
 
One of the principal reasons the Stoltenberg report was commissioned in 2008 were the 
economic benefits that would arise from Nordic cooperation. After the economic crisis in 2008 
and the falling defence budgets, the Nordic ministers of defence and defence chiefs saw a 
significant incentive in Nordic cooperation. Their call for cooperation to ensure cost 
effectiveness in defence budgets is mentioned already in the introduction of the Stoltenberg 
Report.
253
 Discourses about Nordic cooperation in security and defence were for a long time 
defined by these potential benefits. In the Finnish Government Report on Security and Defence 
from 2012, the conclusion regarding Nordic cooperation is that the cooperation “improves cost-
effectiveness and interoperability.”254 Likewise, in a Swedish government’s communication on 
Nordic cooperation from 2013, states that a closer cooperation between the Nordic defence 
forces is “deemed to lead to a more efficient use of resources.”255 Nordic defence cooperation 
had a multi-partisan support. In times of tight state budgets, it is easy to support cooperation that 
is economically beneficial.  
 
In the primary data of this Thesis, the economic benefits of Nordic cooperation are mostly 
absent. Only exception is the Norwegian report, where there is a section committed to budgets 
and arms procurement. The need for Nordic cooperation is very strongly tied to promotion of 
regional stability. The Russian annexation of Crimea has led to a fundamental shift in the 
incentive and motivation behind Nordic defence cooperation in the Nordic security discourses. 
Russia is one of the principal factors in the countries’ respective foreign and security policies. 
This suggests a shift, and for perhaps the first time ever, the Nordic countries are coordinating in 
a certain area because a common perceived threat.  
  
During the Cold War, the Nordic identity was allowed to develop in juxtaposition to the Soviet 
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Union and gain the identity as forward and progressive compared to the Soviet backwardness. 
However, Nordic identity never took form through the securitisation of Russia during the Cold 
War. The extent, to which the securitisation of Russia has taken place all over the world, is 
unprecedented since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not at all only the Nordic countries 
that engage in securitisation – all Western countries do. In particular, Russia’s use of hybrid 
methods can be seen as a recurring theme in the securitisation discourses.  
 
5.6. Hybrid Threats Create Nordic Forerunners  
 
The Nordic countries have no doubt always enjoyed the status of being forerunners, stemming 
from the Cold War and the Nordic Model. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nordic 
countries experienced a decreasing significance and loss of geostrategic importance. Stoltenberg 
would have liked to see a significantly more ambitious Nordic Declaration of Solidarity than it 
de facto ended up being. The main obstacle for a more profound declaration, were the familiar 
obstacles of differing security guarantees. This meant that traditional “hard” security was 
excluded. Instead, “new” challenges and threats were included, such as terrorism, climate 
change, cyber challenges and other non-manmade threats. NORDEFCO focuses on threats such 
as cyber threats because it is an area outside national structures and hence easier to build joint 
cooperation on. This allowed the Nordic countries to regain their status and discourse as both 
forerunners,
256
 an identity that had been lost in the midst of the Europeanisation discourses. With 
the rise of unconventional threats Norden saw some return to relevancy through the declaration.  
 
In the primary data, hybrid threats from Russia are a common theme. The enemy image is 
conveyed through its adoption of unconventional methods. This is turns raises the significance of 
the ability to fight unconventional methods and hence the importance of the Nordic Declaration 
of Solidarity. In essence, the declaration could have become insignificant, but because global 
development, and Russia pursuing its superpower ambitions, the declaration gained worth. 
Russian is increasingly seen as the possessor and user of unconventional warfare. Nordic 
cooperation, seeing as it still remains outside the sphere of hard security, becomes better 
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prepared for precisely the unconventional kind of threats. The rise of the use of hybrid methods, 
terrorism and other irregular warfare allows for the Nordic countries to adopt a position as 
forerunners again, after years of decline. It seems that Nordic cooperation thrives when the 
Nordic countries are described as forerunners. It allows for international relevance and expertise 
that can be shared and importantly incentive to keep developing it.  
 
NATO’s Article 5 only refers to traditional security threats. Some scholars even claim that 
Russia’s development of hybrid warfare is specifically meant to challenge NATO’s Article 5, 
because it uses a combination of conventional and unconventional methods
257
. The structure of 
NORDEFCO is built to better meet unconventional threats. The opt-out, informal and pragmatic 
character of the defence cooperation allows it to meet these threats, unlike the rather rigid 
structure of the Alliance’s Article 5. Specifically for this reason, it is considered beneficial for 
NATO to turn to NORDEFCO as a partner, because of NORDEFCO’s expertise in the area and 
its promotion of regional stability
258
. The common understanding is that NATO obligations 
trump the Nordic declaration of Solidarity on all fronts.
259
 
 
5.7. Where is the Nordic Defence and Security Cooperation Situated?  
 
It is clear that Nordic cooperation and in particular Nordic defence cooperation does not exist in 
isolation. As mentioned previously, the Nordic countries are not the only ones that engage in 
some form of securitisation of Russia. As can be seen in the primary data, the securitisation of 
Russia often takes place within the juxtaposition between Russia and NATO, EU or universal 
values. Russia is portrayed as the other to them. Nordic defence and security cooperation exists 
within a wider framework of securitisation of Russia in a global world order. This brings forth 
the question of where exactly the Nordic cooperation is placed within this order. 
 
In the early years of NORDEFCO, there was some opposition from both American and Russian 
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sides to it. The USA saw NORDEFCO as an attempt to break up NATO
260
 through its potential 
challenge to Article 5. Meanwhile, Russia saw it as an extension of NATO. Still today, some see 
NORDEFCO as a preparation of the Finnish and Swedish NATO membership.
261
 Both the 
Russian and American positions warmed to NORDEFCO as NATO saw it as a source or 
regional stability, and Russia saw it as a way to keep Finland and Sweden out of NATO. 
However, Nordic cooperation is never understood outside the larger framework of NATO. In the 
primary data, NATO is far from a competitor to NORDEFCO, which can be seen through the 
values discussed earlier. Nordic security and defence cooperation gains a complementary 
character. 
 
NORDEFCO as well as Nordic cooperation complements various other international 
engagements differently in each Nordic country. The different security policy choices of each 
country also mean that NORDEFCO has a different function in respective national discourses. In 
Finland and Sweden, Nordic cooperation is often used to come closer to NATO without full 
membership. NORDEFCO is popular both among those who support and oppose NATO – it is 
either portrayed as a tool to get closer to NATO (supporters) or a way to stay outside of NATO 
(opposition). For Norway, it is a manner in which to balance non-EU membership. Denmark has 
been the most inactive NORDEFCO member, yet has participated on an ad hoc basis.
262
 Saxi 
calls NORDEFCO a balance between efficiency and sovereignty, between NATO and non-
alignment.
263
 In this sense, NORDEFCO also contributes to each respective country’s national 
identity. The complementary character of Nordic defence and security cooperation is enhanced 
by the ad hoc and flexible nature of the cooperation in question.  
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5.8.  A Critique of Nordic Security and Defence Cooperation  
 
There has recently been more talk about Nordic cooperation, a Nordic renaissance. The defence 
cooperation within NORDEFCO and outside it has been praised by many as the within the 
defence industry,
264
 as well as academics of international security policy.
265
 However, despite all 
the good publicity and positive press, it has been more talk and less progress. The references to 
the mosaic of memberships in international organisations and the challenges they pose are well 
known. Five countries, three EU members, one of which with the euro currency, and one has 
opted out of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. There are three NATO members. 
Three autonomous areas to two EU member states, yet only one of the three is an EU member 
(Åland). One autonomous area has not even engaged in the sanctions imposed on Russia (Faroe 
Islands). Based on this starting point, Nordic cooperation seems challenging. The differing 
traditional security guarantees apart, some other points of criticism will be discussed below.  
 
5.8.1. US dependence  
 
What is often not addressed, even in Nordic forums, is each respective Nordic state’s dependence 
on USA. The US remains essential for their critical defence. This is addressed strongly in the 
primary data; relations with the USA are seen as crucial to each nation’s defence. There has been 
some joint action through the US-Nordic Security Dialogue, established in 2013 with President 
Obama and the Nordic heads of state, yet there seems to be a lack of initiatives to engage on the 
Nordic level with the USA. It is understood that the US administration (Obama administration) 
viewed the Nordic heads of state as a team in place of representatives of separate states.
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However, in terms of security and defence, Norden is still far from being a team.  
 
5.8.2. Lack of political will  
 
                                                     
264
 Brattberg, Erik & Mohr, Michael (2014) U.S.-Nordic Defense Industry Cooperation: Adding Value to 
the Transatlantic Partnership. Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich: 1  
265Čižik, 2017: 191 
266
 Forss, Stefan & Holopainen, Pekka (2015): Breaking the Nordic Defence Deadlock Strategic Studies 
Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, Pennsylvania: 37 
70 
 
 
 
During the Cold War, the Nordic countries took each other’s security into consideration, in their 
foreign policies. It is not because of a deeper sense of Nordic identity, rather conditions of 
necessity. In establishing and maintaining the Nordic Peace, the Nordic countries considered 
their neighbours’ security simply because it was a matter of national security. A fundamental 
obstacle to Nordic defence and security cooperation is the lack of legitimate political will that 
translates into actions.  
 
Nordic politicians have expressed their interest in Nordic cooperation and in deepening defence 
cooperation. The Nordic defence ministers issued a statement in 2015, calling Russia the largest 
threat to European security and called for deeper cooperation to face the challenges caused by 
the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian aggression in Ukraine.
267
 Indeed, there 
seems to be solidarity – on paper. Finland is going to buy new military aircraft by 2021, 
choosing between French, American and Swedish aircraft. However, the arguments for choosing 
a Swedish one have been few, despite the fact that if Finland and Sweden shared an air force, it 
would significantly improve cooperation. The complex character of modern war and indeed 
hybrid and asymmetrical warfare means that the most significant advances in defence 
cooperation is the joint procurement of weapons, same systems and information sharing. The 
Nordic countries have expressed their will to share information and cyber yet there is little 
cooperation with e.g. Estonia, a country that excels in cyber issues.  
 
 
 
5.8.3. Different understandings of security 
 
NORDEFCO was established, when national territorial defence was deemed irrelevant.
268
 The 
only possible exception is Finland, which has maintained a more traditional view of security, 
despite the end of the Cold War. The discourses about security, Russia and the world have 
shifted significantly, since the establishment of NORDEFCO. This means that the Nordic 
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countries and their defence cooperation have to shift as well, to not become irrelevant. With the 
return of geopolitics and regional security, will the Nordic states rise to face the challenge? 
Nordic cooperation during the Cold War worked on the basis of the lowest common denominator 
and indeed did not include cooperation in defence.  
 
This links in with the modern age understanding of what security means, which links in to 
understanding of dependence and military autonomy.
269
 Finland has a very different view on the 
necessity for military autonomy, which is based on its long history and border with Russia and 
the USSR. This has also defined the Finnish armed forces today. The Finnish understanding of 
security differs from the say Danish understanding of security, as can be seen in the reading of 
the primary data. This means Finland would be reluctant to enter any form of Nordic military 
agreement, since the Finns want guarantees that can contribute to territorial integrity, with the 
Danes cannot provide (due to their broad understanding of security). Hence, the national 
understanding of security plays a defining role in making the limits of Nordic defence and 
security cooperation. In the primary data and overall, the Nordic countries have failed to take a 
common stance on Russia. Rather, Sweden and Denmark refer to values, Norway to NATO and 
Finland bases its take on Russia through the EU.  
 
Does this boil down to the real problem of Nordic cooperation? That there is perhaps a lack of 
Nordic identity per se and that Nordic identity is simply an umbrella term for all that is Nordic 
cooperation; however, it does not translate to an encompassing Nordic identity – at least not 
within security policy. It is commonly said that there is one Nordic model with five exceptions. 
Is it an illusion that Norway or Denmark or even Sweden would come to the aid of Finland? 
Sweden failed to do so for Denmark in 1864 and for Finland during World War II. Even their 
military capacity to do so may be questioned. For the Nordic countries, the national security 
remains first priority. Without calling the Nordic security and defence cooperation void, there is 
also an opportunity to acknowledge that it may be in a formative phase.  
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5.9.  Nordic Cooperation in a Formative Phase  
 
In the primary data, despite Nordic cooperation taking a secondary place of importance, it 
deemed to be an area of further cooperation. The obstacles for deeper integration of security and 
defence policies are in no way seen as insurmountable. In all primary data, this formative phase 
is emphasised. Nordic defence cooperation is seen to be on the road to “further strengths”270 
(Denmark), while Finland takes on the responsibility of “further intensification of Nordic 
cooperation”271 during their NORDEFCO presidency. Indeed, the Nordic “defence cooperation is 
in a “formative phase”272 (Norway). Out of all the primary data, Sweden places the most weight 
on Nordic cooperation, and sees itself as the informal leader within the Norden
273
. Nordefco and 
Nordic security cooperation can be developed and there is potential, however only as 
complementary to bilateral and multilateral forums
274
. 
 
It is over 20 years since Finland and Sweden abandoned their policy of neutrality. The fact that 
the Nordic countries have different security guarantees is a well-known fact. Despite this, 
NORDEFCO was established. Despite the security guarantees, there has been unprecedented 
advancement in a sphere of cooperation previously absent. NORDEFCO has advanced because 
of its flexible character, in times otherwise defined by rigidity – the Nordic Council, Article 5 of 
NATO or the EU bureaucracy. There is development, which cannot be denied. Russia was not a 
crucial factor in the start of Nordic security and defence cooperation. The initiatives for 
NORDEFCO were made before the Russo-Georgian War. However, after the Russian illegal 
annexation of Crimea and its aggressions in Eastern Ukraine, there was a shift in the Nordic 
identity and Russian role in shaping it. Drawing on the conclusions made from the primary data 
and this discussion, the Nordic identity can be portrayed in juxtaposition to Russia like this:   
 
Figure 4: Russia and the Nordic identity construction 
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Russia was previously not a factor in the security dimension of the Nordic identity construction. 
Now, through discourses of othering, Russia has become the main factor in this construction, 
based on the poststructuralist reading of the primary data. Rather, than economic benefits being 
the incentive and global security through the participation in different peacekeeping missions 
being the purpose, Russia is now the main motivator and reason for Nordic cooperation and 
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regional stability is the objective of it. This is the ultimate answer that this Thesis can provide to 
the research question.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The Nordic identity has shifted through the increasingly hostile Russian behaviour. It has 
allowed for the already existing security cooperation through NORDEFCO and elsewhere to take 
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on a more defined security dimension, where Russia plays a central role. Russia now plays a 
contributing role in the motivation for further cooperation and how Nordic cooperation is 
justified in security discourses. The economic benefits are no longer referred to when justifying 
Nordic cooperation. The different respective understandings of security are the primary obstacle 
for deeper cooperation.  
 
6.1. Nordic-Russian relations in the long run 
 
The primary data of this Thesis place themselves at the end of a long line of different Nordic 
discourses pertaining to Russia. Russia has always been of central importance to the Nordic 
countries – as a neighbour, friend or enemy. The Nordic discourses pertaining to Russia have 
previously not left any space for the construction of a Nordic identity with security cooperation 
through processes of linking. Rather, the traditional security guarantees were referred to. This 
Thesis shows how there has indeed been a paradigm shift in the Nordic identity – for the first 
time in modern history there is a security dimension to it. In doing so, the Nordic countries have 
abandoned the identity construction through asecuritisation and new ontology-seeking methods 
are employed. This represents ultimate change in Nordic identity brought about through the 
Russian actions, culminating in the annexation of Crimea in 2014.  
 
Despite the different security guarantees, Nordic security and defence cooperation have been 
permitted to make small advancements. This rejects the idea that the national security priorities 
and choices are the main obstacle for Nordic security cooperation. Rather, based on the analysis 
and outcomes of this Thesis, it is the understanding of the notion “security” itself that provides 
the most fundamental obstacle. To truly deepen Nordic cooperation a more stream-lined 
understanding of security would be needed. It is the understanding of security, coupled with the 
historical views on Russia that represent the most striking differences between the Nordic 
countries.  
 
The primary data is situated in time of global uncertainty. As was seen with the Finnish report, it 
was quickly criticised for its timing because it was published a week prior to the Brexit 
referendum and was hence not included in the report. Other important developments not included 
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in the reports are the election of President Trump and the development of the EU. It seems the 
Franco-German alliance has been rekindled with the election of President Emmanuel Macron, 
however not all EU member states seem to be on the same page with France and Germany 
regarding the development of the EU. There has been an increase in terrorism, also in the Nordic 
countries. The reports prove how the Nordic identity with its security dimension is in a potential 
phase, which proves the relevance of the Reports, despite not including more recent 
development. Russian actions, global developments and how these are portrayed in Nordic 
discourse will be decisive for the development of the Nordic identity.  
 
6.2. Other others  
 
Nordic identity is of course not only constructed through the othering of Russia or in 
juxtaposition to Russia. Rather, as the poststructuralist discourse theory emphasises, identity is 
constructed through multiple others and different degrees of differentiation. The Nordic identity 
is complex – like all identities. In primary data, there are certain notable others, other than 
Russia, that emerge. The most common, shared in all reports, is the migration and refugee crisis 
in Europe. In the Danish report, flows of immigrants are described as equally threatening to 
Danish security as Russia is. It has the potential to perturb the stability that Danish report 
advocates for clearly. Migrants, the polarisation of societies are all seen as threatening. It is also 
used as an identity construction device as it leads to strong discourses of differentiation between 
the country in question and the migrants, which are portrayed as a threat to national security.  
Within Nordic identity construction, not all others are concerned with security. The Nordic 
identity is constructed through a variety of non-selves. 
 
 
6.2.1. The Arctic as a new low-tension area 
 
The Nordic identity of a region of low-tension in opposition to Europe was lost at the collapse of  
the Cold War. However there seems to have emerged a new area of low-tension that is of grest 
importance to the Nordic countries: the Arctic. Despite global tensions, cooperation has pursued 
on certain themes within the Arctic Council.. Despite most of the countries in the Arctic Council 
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have taken part in the sanctions on Russia after the illegal annexation of Crimea, security has 
remained off the Arctic agenda.  The Arctic is gaining importance with the melting icecap and it 
may be of geostrategic importance in the future and the Nordic countries may utilise the events 
and actions there to construct the Nordic identity.  
 
6.3. Final Remarks  
 
There are multiple factors to take into consideration when studying identity. The self, the other 
the manner in which they are constructed. This Thesis has focused specifically on how the 
portrayal of Russia in Nordic discourse contributes towards the construction of the Nordic 
identity with a security dimension. To gain further depth into the Nordic identity and Russia, a 
similar research could be undertaken, however looking at the Nordic Council’s and Nordic 
Council of Minister’s statements after 2014. The role of the Baltic States for the Nordic countries 
in relation to Russia would also provide a deeper understanding of Nordic identity. The Baltic 
countries play a crucial role in the developments of the Baltic Sea Region.  
 
Responding to Archer’s quote from 2009, with which the Thesis commenced: “...Or is there a 
new area - security and defence - to plant the Nordic flags where they have rarely been seen 
before?”, one can conclude that the flags have been planted. Global developments, Russian 
actions and the Baltic Sea Region are three important factors, among many that are used to 
construct a Nordic identity.  After 2014, the Nordic countries have constructed this identity 
through the othering of Russia. The security dimension of the Nordic cooperation seems to be 
here to stay.  
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